Pace Environmental Law Review
Volume 15
Issue 2 Summer 1998

Article 9

June 1998

Pushing RBST: How the Law and the Political Process Were Used
to Sell Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin to America
David Aboulafia

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr

Recommended Citation
David Aboulafia, Pushing RBST: How the Law and the Political Process Were Used to Sell
Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin to America, 15 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 603 (1998)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/9
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Environmental Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace.
For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

Pushing RBST:
How the Law and the Political Process
Were Used to Sell Recombinant
Bovine Somatotropin
to America
DAVID ABOULAFIA*

Table of Contents
I. Introduction ....................................
II. The Regulation of Biotechnology ................
A. Generally ...................................
B. The Scope Document .......................
C. The Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act ............
1. Generally ...............................
2. Residue Testing .........................
D. The Role of the Food & Drug
Administration .............................
1. Generally ...............................
2. Labeling Guidelines .....................
a. Constitutional Implications .........
3. Post Approval Reaction & Controversy..
III. The Adverse Effects of rbST on Cows ...........
IV. Potential Effects on Human Health ............
A. Antibiotics ..................................
B . IG F-1 ......................................
V. BST's Potential Effects on the Dairy Industry..
VI. Analysis ........................................

604
607
607
609
611
611
613
614
614
616
618
621
626
628
628
632
636
640

* This article is dedicated to Pace University Professors Suzan M. Porto,
M. Stuart Madden and Joseph Olivenbaum, with sincere appreciation for their
interest, dedication, and instruction. Also, dedicated to Andrea and the kids,
who let me work.

603

1

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

604

[Vol. 15

A. The Limitations of Risk Assessment
Methodology ................................
B. Known Risk and the Inherent Difference of
Biotechnology ...............................
C. Socioeconomic Effects .......................
D. The Promotion of Biotechnology ............
E. The Failings of the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act ...............................
F. Labeling ....................................
VII. Conclusion ......................................

640
642
646
647
650
652
653

I deem it important that... you meet some counterweight
against the snobbery of social institutions: against the
bland assumption that because things social are, therefore
they must be; against the touching faith that the current
rationalizations of an institution, first, fit the facts, second,
exhaust the subject, third, negate other, negate better
possibilities.'

I.

Introduction

Bovine Somatotropin (bST), otherwise known as Bovine
Growth Hormone (BGH), is a hormone which occurs naturally in cattle. 2 It is known to increase appetite, weight, and
milk production in cows. 3 Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin
(rbST) is a genetically engineered, synthetic bST created
through recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (rDNA)
4
technology.
All life forms have deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) composed of what is principally the same genetic material. 5 A
1. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLEBUSH 1, 42 (1930).
2. See Marianna Kulka and Susan Semenak, MILK SHAKE-UP; A Production-BoostingHormone is Raising Safety and Public Relations Concerns for
the Dairy Industry; MILKING: THE ISSUE, EDMONTON J., May 28, 1995, at C7
[hereinafter Kulka & Semenak].

3. Id.
4. See John Beiswenger, Moving Beyond Risk in Assessing Technological
Artifacts: The Case of Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin, 16 VT. L. REv. 667,
667 (1992).
5. Id. at 670 (citing INDusTRiAL BIOTECHNOLOGY ASS'N, BIOTECHNOLOGY AT
WORK: WHAT IS BIOTECHNOLOGY? 3 (1989)).
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bird is different from a bear, for instance, because the genetic
material making up each creature's DNA is arranged in different sequences and appears in varying amounts. 6 Genes
known to produce certain traits can be spliced from a host
organism and transplanted into a recipient organism; the recipient then inherits that trait and ultimately passes it along
to its offspring. 7 Genetic material is interchangeable between many organisms." For instance, researchers have already successfully spliced a gene from a flounder into a
tomato to increase the latter's resistance to freezing. 9
In the case of rbST, a cow's bST-producing gene is spliced
onto a plasmid of an E. coli bacteria.' 0 A plasmid is a freefloating piece of DNA which is able to pass through another
bacteria's outer cell wall." The recipient bacteria chosen by
the genetic scientist assimilates the plasmid and inherits the
ability to produce the hormone, which it immediately begins
to do. 12 Once placed into a fermentation tank the bacteria
reproduces, 13 passing the bST-producing trait along to the 16
billion bacteria it may reproduce each day. 14 The resulting
synthetic hormone is collected and administered in the form
of an injection to cows.' 5 Treated cows may produce up to
forty percent more milk each day.16 Synthetic bST was origi6. Id.
7. Id. at 672 (citing

MARGARET MELLON, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE ENviRONMENT, at 21 (1988)).
8. Id. at 671 (citing MELLON, at 23).
9. See Andrew K. Weegar, Fishy Tomatoes and Hot Potatoes; The Tomato

in Your SupermarketMay Have Genes in it From a Flounder.Wouldn't You Like
to Know That? MAINE TIMES, Mar. 31, 1995, at 11.

10. See Beiswenger, supra note 4, at 673 (citing RuRAL VERMONT, BOVINE
(1988)).
11. See id.
12. Id.
13. See Tony Hiss, How Now Drugged Cow: Biotechnology Comes to Rural
Vermont, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Oct. 1, 1994, available in 1994 WL 1330636, at
*7.
14. See Jack Challem, Defend Yourself Against Supergerms, Antibiotic Resistant Bacteria, NATURAL HEALTH, Mar. 1995, at 56.
15. See Beiswenger, supra note 4, at 667.
16. See Reid G. Adler, Controlling the Applications of Biotechnology, 1
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1 (1988), available in LEXIS, Allrev Database, at *17 (citing Debra Schwarz of the Wisconsin Family Farm Defense Fund, Inc.).
GROWTH HORMONE: WHAT'S IN IT FOR VERMONT? 1

3
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nally developed by Genentech, Incorporated, and licensed to
the Monsanto Corporation 17 in the early 1980s.18 Monsanto
is the only company producing the drug and which has received approval to market it to the public.' 9
With a testing and approval process that lasted well over
a decade, rbST has been more extensively studied than perhaps any other animal drug in the United States. 20 Monsanto has invested one-half billion dollars towards its
development over that time. 2 ' The hormone rbST carries
with it an impressive list of approvals and endorsements, including those from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS), American Medical Association (AMA), National Institutes of Health (NIH), World Health Organization (WHO),
United Kingdom Medicines Commission, American Council
on Health and Science (ACHS), Office of Technology Assess-

17. Monsanto, the company that brought us PCB's and Agent Orange, was
recently named among thel00 most socially responsible corporations in
America by Business Ethics magazine. See Maijorie Kelly, Chemical Company
Can Be Good Citizen, Monsanto Proves Greatly Improved Environmental Record Stands Out, STAR-TRIBUNE NEWSPAPER (Mpls.-St.Paul), June 17, 1996, at
3D.
18. See Alex Barnum, Battle Over Milk Hormone Hits Marketplace, Dairies
In No Hurry To Use Controversial Bovine Growth Drug, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRON., February 3, 1994, at D1.

19. See International Dairy Foods Association v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 75
(2d Cir. 1996). American Cyanamid and Upjohn were also rbST developers. See
Symposium, Biotechnology and Tort Liability, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 791 (1994)
(citing Daniel S. Greenberg, Higher Milk Production Isn't Worth the Money
Spent on It, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 1990, at B3). Eli Lilly and Co. and Dow Chemical,
through a joint venture, researched rbST through Eli Lilly's animal health division, but abandoned further development of the drug. See Telephone Interview
with Ron Cooper, Manager of New Products Planning and Development, Eli
Lilly & Co., Elanco Animal Health Division, Indianapolis, Ind. (Nov. 13, 1996)
[hereinafter Telephone Interview with Ron Cooper]; Telephone Interview with
Amy Alvis, Business Analyst, Dow Chemical Corp. (Nov. 19, 1996) [Telephone
Interview with Amy Alvis].
20. See Dale D. Buss, Bovine Growth Hormone Approval Sparks Controversy, FOOD PROCESSING, Jan. 1, 1994, available in 1994 WL 12765297.
21. See FDA Approval for the Use of the Hormone BST, Federal News Service, Aug. 3, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, at *3 [hereinafter FDA
Approval for the Use of the Hormone BST].
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ment (OTA), 2 2 the American Dietetic Association (ADA)23
24
and former U.S. Surgeon General C. Everett Koop.
However, a sustained controversy has surrounded rbST,
one that is not fully explained simply by the fact that it is the
first agricultural product developed through biotechnology. 2 5
The magnitude and scope of the controversy surrounding
rbST is due to several factors. These factors include: 1) the
nature of the laws regulating rbST; 2) the debilitating effects
the drug may have on animals; 3) the unknown and long term
impact that use of the drug might have on human health; 4)
the questionable nature and character of the FDA approval
process; and 5) the drug's potential to affect the socioeconomic
foundation of the dairy industry.
Section II of this Article represents an overview of the
laws governing biotechnology and how these laws were applied in the case of rbST. The section also describes some of
the controversies surrounding the FDA's approval of rbST.
Section III describes the adverse effects the drug may have on
animals. Section IV discusses the drug's potential to affect
human health. Section V details how the use of rbST may impact upon the dairy industry.
II.
A.

The Regulation of Biotechnology

Generally

The field of biotechnology is governed primarily by statutory law. 2 6 The statutes governing this area are found within
the Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA),2 7 the Federal Insec22. See BST Report Continued, INDUSTRIAL ENV'T., June 1, 1995, available
in 1995 WL 8110452.
23. See generally Buss, supra note 20.
24. C. Everett Koop, M.D., Statement of C. Everett Koop on the Introduction
of Supplemental BST, (photo. reprint) Feb. 6, 1994.
25. See FDA Approval for the Use of the Hormone BST, supra note 21, at *3.
26. The "Scope" document outlines the applicable laws governing biotechnology. See Exercise of Federal Oversight Within Scope of Statutory Authority:
Planned Introductions of Biotechnology Products Into the Environment, 57 Fed.
Reg. 6753, 6754 (1992) [hereinafter Exercise of Federal Oversight].
27. Toxic Substances Control Act of 1977 (TSCA) §§ 1-412, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2601 -2692 (1997).

5
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ticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 28 the Virus,
Serum, and Toxin Act (VSTA), 29 Federal Plant Pest Act
(FPPA),3° Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)3 1
and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 32 Agencies with applicable regulatory authority include the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA), the National Institutes of
Health (NIH), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). 3
The "Coordinated Framework," 3 4 published by the Council on Natural Resources and the Environment 35 in 1986,
serves as a technical guide to the coordination of regulatory
authority among the various federal agencies with jurisdiction over biotechnology, and directs which agencies have jurisdiction over which products. 36 The Framework's view is
that existing statutes are generally able to effectively regulate biotechnology.3 7 Regulations, however, can be permitted
to evolve based upon scientific revelations as to the potentials
for risk,38 presumably for those risks inherent in products al28. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1972 (FIFRA)
§§ 2-34, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1997).
29. Virus, Serum, Toxin Act of 1913 (VSTA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 151-159 (1997).
30. Federal Plant Pest Act (FPPA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 150aa -150jj (1997).
31. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301395 (1997).
32. National Environment Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) §§ 2-209, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321 -4370d (1997).
33. See Linda Maher, The Environment and the Domestic Regulatory
Framework for Biotechnology, 8 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 133, 139 (1993) (citing
Office of Science & Technology, Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302, 23,303 (1986)).
34. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg.
23,302 (1986) [hereinafter Coordinated Framework].
35. In April of 1994, an interagency "Working Group" was formed under the
White House Cabinet Council on Natural Resources and the Environment for
the purpose of researching and coordinating government's regulatory policies
for biotechnological products. See Proposal For A Coordinated Framework Regulation of Biotechnology, 49 Fed. Reg. 50,856 (1984) [hereinafter Proposal For A
Coordinated Framework]. This document was the proposed version of the
Framework document which was then refined and introduced as the ultimate
Coordinated Framework document.
36. See generally Exercise of Federal Oversight, 57 Fed. Reg. at 6753.
37. See Coordinated Framework, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23,302.
38. See id. at 23,303.
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ready approved and in use.3 9 Risk assessment can be approached in much the same way as for "traditionally modified
organisms." 40 The authors of the Framework did not appro41
priately describe how oversight powers might be applied.
Nor did they define what the scope of these powers might
be.

B.

42

The Scope Document

In July of 1990, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, working in conjunction with the President's Council on
Competitiveness, filled this gap with the publication of its socalled "Scope" policy document. 43 Finalized on February 27,
1992, this document contains critical guidelines which limit
the discretionary authority of these agencies in regulating
44
biotechnology.
First, the Scope document provides that oversight is to be
exercised by an agency only when there is evidence indicating
that there is an unreasonable risk associated with the bioengineered product or organism. 45 Oversight is not to be exercised simply because a product is bio-engineered. 4 6 The
risk assessment is to focus upon the characteristics of the
39. See Nitrofurans; Withdrawal of Approval of New Animal Drug Applications, 56 Fed. Reg. 41,902, 41,903 (1991) [hereinafter Nitrofurans] (indicating
that "approval [of a new animal drug] may be withdrawn if 'new evidence,' evaluated together with previously existing evidence, shows that the drug is not
shown to be safe").
40. See Coordinated Framework, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23,308.
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. See EXERCISE OF FEDERAL OVERSIGHT WITHIN SCOPE OF STATUTORY AuTHORITY: Planned Introductions of Biotechnology Products Into the Environment, 57 Fed. Reg. at 6753, 6753, 6754 [hereinafter Exercise of Federal
Oversight].
44. See id.
45. A risk is "unreasonable" when the value of the reduction in risk obtained by additional oversight is greater than the cost thereby imposed. See id.
at 6756. But cf Lake v. FDA, Civil Action No. 88-6275, 1989 U.S. Dist. Lexis
7179, at *9 (E. D. Pa. June 26, 1989) (referring to medical devices, the court
stated that "[w]hen there is no valid scientific evidence of efficacy, and the risks
are unknown, the risk is unreasonable").
46. See Exercise of Federal Oversight, 57 Fed. Reg. at 6756.
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product, not the process by which it was created. 4 7 A processfocused oversight would work to discourage use of emerging
technology. 4 A cost element is imposed whereby the benefits
49
achieved by oversight must exceed the cost of the oversight.
However, agencies are given broad discretion in initiating a
range of oversight options, including the labeling of products. 50 Second, agencies are allowed to exercise their discretion and permit companies to skirt the regulatory process
entirely by determining that a genetically manipulated product is so similar to its "natural" counterpart that it is not
"new," therefore, requiring no new oversight. 5 1 Third, the
"costs of testing to meet regulatory requirements" are described as barriers to the development of the industry.5 2 Finally, the Scope document asserts that industry can
generally be trusted to act responsibly because it knows that
harsher oversight might follow irresponsible actions. 5 3 The
document states that there are only limited instances where
the private market will not provide adequate safeguards, on
47. Id. This approach was in fact mandated by the first Principle of Regulatory Review for Biotechnology in 1990. Id. at 6755. The four principles as approved by the Bush Administration in short are: 1) Oversight is not to be
focused on the biotechnological process per se; 2) regulations should present a
minimal burden to industry while adequately protecting the public; 3) regulations should adapt to swift changes in technology; and 4) in order to "create
opportunities for the application of .. .new biotechnology products," performance-based, not design-based standards should be employed. Id. at 6760.
48. Id. at 6756.
49. See at 6756. But cf. Nitrofurans, 56 Fed. Reg. at 41,903 (indicating that
the "cost benefit considerations" do not apply to the Delaney and general safety
clauses of the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act).
50. See Exercise of Federal Oversight, 57 Fed. Reg. at 6757-58.
51. Id. at 6759.
52. Id. at 6761.
53. See id. at 6757.
(In applying the risk-based approach there will of course be areas
in which regulatory interventions are frequent, and areas in which
such interventions are legally authorized but are less common because the industry operates safely and the occasions for regulation
and enforcement are fewer. Such safety could be the result of longstanding industry practices, and of industry's pragmatic understanding that government intervention - whether through federal
or state law or otherwise - would occur if safety rules were
violated).
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its own, to protect the public and the environment from the
potential dangers of biotechnology. 54 It is suggested that regulation be used as a shield to protect industry "from avoidable incidents that could tarnish its image and
development." 5 5 The Scope document represents the views of
the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton Administrations, that a principal government role is to support and nurture biotechnology, and create the least restrictive regulatory environment
56
possible.
C.

The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)
1.

Generally

RbST is regulated by the FDA under the FDCA. 57 The
FDCA requires that a new animal drug be safe for the
animal, 58 that an end product from an animal treated with
54. Id. at 6761.
55. See id. But cf. Barr Laboratories, Inc. v. Harris, Food Drug Cosm. L.
Rep. (CCH) § 38,012 (D.D.C. 1979), as cited in PETER BARTON Hurr & RICHARD
C. MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG LAW 1050 (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter HurT & MERRILL] ("The [Food, Drug, and Cosmetic] Act's purpose is to protect public health,
not ensure or enhance equitable economic circumstances."); Barr Laboratories,
Inc. v. Harris, 482 F. Supp. 1183, 1185 (D.D.C. 1980) ( stating that "[nleither
the legislative language [of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act] nor the [committee] reports suggest any intention to safeguard competitive positions within the
industry. .. ).
56. See generally Maher, supra note 33. Cf. WILLIAM F. FUNK ET. AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE 1, 122 (1997) [hereinafter FUNK] ("Pres-

idents Bush and Clinton continued and expanded the approach of the Reagan
administration to regulatory oversight"). See also A STUDY CONDUCTED BY THE
BRANCH OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, USE OF BOVINE SOMATOTROPIN (BST) IN THE UNITED STATES: ITS POTENTIAL EFFECTS (photo. reprint
EXECUTIVE

1995) Jan. 1994.
57. See FDCA, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395.
58. See id. 21 U.S.C. at § 360b (e)(1)(A) ("tihe Secretary shall... issue an
order withdrawing approval of an application . . . with respect to any new
animal drug if the Secretary finds.. .that experience or scientific data show that
such drug is unsafe for use under the conditions of use upon the basis of which
the application was approved. . ."); id. at § 360b (e)(1)(F) ("If the Secretary...
finds that there is an imminent hazard to the health of man or of the animals
for which such drug is intended, he may suspend the approval of such application immediately .. ."); id. at § 360b (d)(2)(B) ("[iun determining whether such
drug is safe for use... the Secretary shall consider.., the cumulative effect on
man or animal of such drug..."); id. at § 360b (c)(2)(A)(viii) (the Secretary shall
approve an abbreviated application for a drug unless .. .the inactive ingredi-
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the drug be safe for human consumption, and that the drug
can be as effective as it is claimed to be. 5 9 The manufacturer
must be able to produce the drug with a constant level of po60
tency and purity.
Additionally, the Act mandates consideration of the new
animal drug's "cumulative effect on man or animal,"6 1 and a
determination as to whether the conditions under which the
drug will be employed will be "reasonably certain to be followed in practice."6 2 Approval of a drug may be immediately
withdrawn if it is found that the product represents an "imminent hazard to health of man or animals." 63 A profound
exception to the strictness of the statute is that a drug,
proven carcinogenic in man or animal, may nevertheless be
used if it will not harm the recipient animal and if residues of
the drug do not appear in "any food yielded by or derived
from" the animal.6 4 This exception permitted DES, a synthetic hormone, to be used in cattle feed at least five years
after it was demonstrated to be carcinogen in laboratory
65
animals.
ents of the drug are unsafe for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling proposed ... [or] the composition of the
drug is unsafe under such conditions because of the type or quantity of inactive
ingredients included or the manner in which the inactive ingredients are included...").
59. See generally id. at § 360b. Effectiveness must be demonstrated by
"substantial evidence." See New Animal Drug Applications, 21 C.F.R. § 514.1
(b)(8)(ii) (1997).
60. See 21 C.F.R. at § 514.1 (b)(5).
61. FDCA, 21 U.S.C. at § 360b (d)(2)(B).
62. Id. at § 360b (d)(2)(D).
63. Id. at § 360b (e)(1). An imminent hazard may be found where new evidence shows that the drug is not "safe for use under the conditions of use upon
the basis of which the application was approved."Id. See also Food and Drugs,
General Administrative Rulings and Decisions, 21 C.F.R. § 2.5(a) (1997) (stating that the "It] he 'imminent hazard' may be declared at any point in the chain
of events which may ultimately result in harm to the public health. The occurrence of the final anticipated injury is not essential.
64. See FDCA, 21 U.S.C. at § 360b (d)(1)(I).
65. See Fred Kuchler, et. al, Regulating Food Safety: The Case of Animal
Growth Hormones, FOOD REVIEW, July 1, 1989, at 25, available in 1989 WL

2508076, at *6.DES was an FDA approved drug administered to pregnant woman in order to decrease their risks of miscarriage. See also GERALD W. BosTON * M. STUART MADDEN, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND Toxic TORTS 1, at 40508 (1994) [hereinafter BOSTON & MADDEN]. Years later, DES was linked to in-
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Residue Testing

Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, anyone who
files an application for a new animal drug is required to describe testing methods for determining whether residues of
the drug, if any, exist in the end product provided for human
consumption. 66 These methods must include ways for detecting substances which may be created in food because of
the drug's use. 6 7 However, when the agency is provided with
"adequate information" reasonably establishing that the
drug will not appear in food "in concentrations considered un68
safe," then there is no requirement for residue analysis.
The FDA stated it did not require Monsanto to develop
such a test because it had judged rbST to be safe for human
consumption, and because "developing such a test.., would
69
be useless for regulatory purposes."
juries to the reproductive systems of females whose grandmothers had consumed the drug. Id.
66. See FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 360b (b)(1)(G). See also Nitrofurans, 56 Fed.
Reg. at 41,902 (approval of two new drugs withdrawn where drugs were proven
animal carcinogens and no test capable of detecting residues in animal tissues
was provided by manufacturer); Ivy-Reed Co., Inc.: Steer-oid; Opportunity For
Hearing, 44 Fed. Reg. 1,462 (1979) (New Animal Drug Application found incomplete where sponsor failed to submit data demonstrating that unsafe residues of
the drug would not be present in human food).
67. See FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 360b (b)(1)(G).
68. See New Animal Drug Applications, 21 C.F.R. at § 514.1 (b)(7). But cf.
United States v. Anderson Seafoods, Inc., 622 F.2d 157, 161-62 (5th Cir. 1980)
(indicating that the FDA acted within its discretion in finding that mercury
present in swordfish, as a result of environmental pollution, is an "added substance" which may be injurious to health under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, even though the amount attributable to the actions of man are unknown or
unquantifiable, and even though the amount may present only a minute potential for harm.); United States v. An Article of Food, Inc., 752 F.2d 11, 15 (1st
Cir. 1985) (claimant's evidence that potassium nitrate is naturally present in
foods, that a Puerto Rico Health Department study had determined it safe for
human consumption, and that there was an absence of conclusive evidence
showing that the substance was unsafe, were insufficient to rebut an FDA finding that the substance was an unsafe food additive under the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act).
69. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, FDA VETERINARIAN, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT BST, (photo.
reprint 1995) May/June 1994, at 8 [hereinafter USDHHS, FDA VETERINARIAN].

The AMA's Scientific Advisory Council had stated that the development of such
a test was feasible. See Why Milk With RBGH Needs To Be Labeled, 140 CONG.
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The Role of the Food and Drug Administration
1.

Generally

Federal review of rbST began in 1985,70 but years before
the drug's approval, legislators began to express their concerns. 7 1 Many of these concerns were focused on the FDA,
72
the agency with primary oversight responsibility for rbST.
In September of 1989, the chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee, Senator Patrick J. Leahy, wrote to the
FDA Commissioner regarding the FDA's rbST testing procedures.7 3 Among the Senator's concerns were the methods the
74
FDA employed to assess the product's potential risks.
Three months later, having received no reply to his inquiry,
the Senator wrote again. 75 Leahy, with his correspondence
still unanswered, in a formal request also signed by seven
congressmen, asked the General Accounting Office (GAO) to
76
conduct a thorough study of the FDA's rbST review process.
REC. H2159 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1995) (statement of Rep. Bernie Sanders). In
April of 1997 it was reported that a sixteen year old boy, with the help of his
chemistry teacher, invented a test to detect the presence of rbST. See Linda
Stewart Ball, Students Have Ideas Down To A Science, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Apr. 6, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2659583. Several months later, however,
FDA's position still appeared to be that no such test existed. See Nancy Millman, Gene Flap Spawning Food Fight, CHIC. TRIB., Aug. 18, 1997, available in
1997 WL 3579419. Meanwhile, the General Accounting Office has formally advised the FDA to "develop a comprehensive strategy to address animal drug
residues in milk." See Advisory Committee; Notice of Meeting, 61 Fed. Reg
20,831, 20,832 (1996).
70. See Keith Schneider, FDA. Accused of Improper Ties In Review of Drug
for Milk Cows, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1990, at A21.
71. See Bovine Growth Hormone Faces Renewed Congressional Criticism,
BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWSWATCH, February 5, 1990, at 3 [hereinafter BGH Faces
Renewed Criticism) (indicating that in February of 1990 Representative Peter
Smith introduced a bill that would have prohibited the consumption of milk
products produced with rbST for three years and which would have allowed the
product to be used for research purposes only); see also Providing Time To
Learn The Economic and Health Effects of BST, 136 CONG. REC. H310 (daily ed.
Feb. 7, 1990) (statement of Rep. Smith).
72. See Robert A. Bohrer, Symposium, Food Products Affected by Biotechnology, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 653, 675 (1994).
73. See BGH Faces Renewed Criticism, supra note 71. at 3.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id.
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Two months later, Dr. Richard J. Burroughs, an FDA
veterinarian who participated in the review of rbST, was
fired after disputing the agency's interpretation of industry
studies, and after being accused of "slowing down the approval process. .. ."77 He claimed that some FDA reviewers
were not competent, and that the agency was covering up
animal health problems stemming from the drug's use. 78 He
charged that the agency had become "an extension of the
79
drug industry."
Meanwhile, by March of 1993, the GAO had formally recommended to the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (USDHHS), which oversees the FDA, that the
agency be made accountable "to answer specific questions"
about the safety of rbST.8 0 Five months later, the controversy climbed further up Capitol Hill, as was evidenced in a
news conference pertaining to the impending approval of the
drug.8 1 The conference was attended by six senators, five of
whom supported the product.8 2 Senator Russell Feingold, the
lone dissenter, characterized rbST as "the Edsel of the biotechnology industry," and stated that "it's not by chance that
the first and last speakers here [Senators John Danforth and
Kit Bond] happen to be from Missouri, the headquarters of
the Monsanto corporation. '8 3 In November of 1993, the FDA,
after thorough testing, concluded that milk from rbST treated
cows was essentially the same as milk from untreated cows,
and after seeking a second opinion from the NIH regarding

77. See Schneider, supra note 70. On August 2, 1991 the Federal Merits
Protection Board ordered the FDA to reinstate Dr. Burroughs to his former position. See also Jon Sawyer, FDA Loses Decision on Firing ... Cow Hormone
Case is Focus of Dispute, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 11, 1991, at 7C.

78. See Schneider, supra note 70.
79. Id.
80. James Ridgeway, Robocow: How Tomorrow's Farming is Poisoning Today's Milk, VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 14, 1995, availablein LEXIS, News Library, at
*8.
81. See generally FDA Approval for the Use of the Hormone BST, supra note
21, at *7.
82. See id.
83. Id.
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the safety of the product,8 4 the FDA approved the drug for
use.

85

2.

Labeling Guidelines

The FDA expressed earlier the view that most bio-engineered products needed no more regulation than did other
products.8 6 The agency did not believe that bio-engineered
food end-products were materially different from their nonengineered counterparts.8 7 If anything, genetically modified
foods were actually safer than foods modified by conventional
breeding methods.8 8 In February of 1994, the FDA published
its "interim" guidelines on rbST product labeling.8 9 The
guidelines did not pertain to products from rbST-treated
cows, but sought to regulate, albeit "voluntarily," the labeling
of products that did not come from treated cattle. 90 Having
decided that there was no material difference between rbSTtreated products and those untreated, 9 1 the agency deter84. See Stuart Auchincloss, Does Genetic Engineering Need Genetic Engineers?: Should the Regulation of Genetic Engineering Include a New Professional Discipline?,20 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. J. 37, 44 (1993) (citing Guy Gugliotta,
A Wonder Drug or a Threat?, WASH. POST, June 24, 1990, at A3).
85. See Animal Drugs, Feeds, and Related Products; Sterile Sometribove
Zinc Suspension, 58 Fed. Reg. 59,946 (1993). See also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PRESS RELEASE #P93-40, Nov. 5, 1993 [hereinafter U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES].
86. See Maher, supra note 33, at 149.
87. See generally Alex Barnum, FDA Rules Raise Questions, SAN FRAN.
CHRON., June 15, 1992, at B1. The USDA has expressed a similar view. See
Final Policy Statement for Research and Regulation of Biotechnology Processes
and Products, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,336, 23,337 (1986).
88. See Barnum, at B1.
89. Interim Guidance on the Voluntary Labeling of Milk and Milk Products
From Cows That Have Not Been Treated With Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin, 59 Fed. Reg. 6279 (1994) [hereinafter Interim Guidance].
90. Interim Guidance, 59 Fed. Reg. at 6280.
91. But cf Genentech, Inc. v. Bowen, 676 F. Supp. 301, 311 (D. D.C. 1987)
(indicating that human growth hormone (hGH) derived from human pituitary
glands, and synthetic human growth hormone produced through recombinant
DNA technology (r-hGH), although identical in chemical structure, are not the
same for the purposes of the Orphan Drug Act). See also Letter from Samuel S.
Epstein, M.D. to the Editors of The Journal of the American Medical Association, JAMA, Mar. 20, 1991, at 1389 available in 1991 WL 4860198 [hereinafter
JAMA] (rbST's molecular structure is up to 3% different from natural bST, containing as many as nine additional amino acids).
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mined that not only did it lack the authority to mandate the
labeling of treated products, 9 2 but that labels such as "rbSTfree," if not put in a "proper" context, would be viewed as
false, misleading, and a violation of the FDCA. 93 Such a
"proper context" might be achieved if a company either included a statement that no significant difference has been
shown between milk derived from rbST-treated cows and
non-rbST-treated cows, or detailed its reasons for not treating cows with rbST.9 4 The proffered reasons could not, however, mention any safety or quality issues, which the agency
95
considered fully resolved.
In addition, a substantial record-keeping and "certification" burden was placed on companies making a "rbST-free"
claim. 96 This burden was accompanied by the assertion that
a firm might find itself defenseless "in the face of circumstantial evidence that it is using rbST or selling milk from treated
cows [despite claims to the contrary] .,97
Critics charged that the guidelines contained language
"strikingly similar" to that found in a legal memorandum
Monsanto previously distributed, 98 which warned companies
not to label their products as BGH- free. 99 In any event, following the publication of the guidelines, Monsanto proceeded
92. But see Anne Miller, Time for Government to Get Mooo-ving: Facing Up
to the BST Labeling Problem, 18 HAMLINE. L. REV.503, 516 (1995) (arguing
that the FDA has "broad discretion when regulating food standards ...is not
limited to regulating labels solely for health and safety reasons . . ." and therefore does have the authority to mandate rbST labeling).
93. See Interim Guidance, 59 Fed. Reg. at 6280. But see FDCA, 21 U.S.C. at
§ 321(n) (stating that "in determining whether the labeling ... is misleading,
there shall be taken into account... the extent to which the labeling... fails to
reveal facts material . . .with respect to consequences which may result from
the use of the article to which the labeling ...relates

..

. ") (emphasis added).

94. See id.
95. See id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. It has been noted that the FDA will routinely incorporate language provided by the manufacturer into its product labeling regulations. See Telephone
Interview with Ron Cooper, supra note 19.
99. See XII THE HUMANE FARMING ASSOCIATION SPECIAL REPORT, THE BATTLE AGAINST BGH TAINTED MILK RAGES ON 14, at 7, n.d. [hereinafter THE BATTLE AGAINST BGH].
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to levy suit against two dairies, which did just that, 10 0 and
the company wrote to over two thousand other firms, threatening them with legal action if they dared to do the same. 1 1
a.

Constitutional Implications

The FDA guidelines basically permitted the states to set
their own, more specific, labeling restrictions, as long as they
0 2
set regulations falling within the agency's parameters.
Thereafter, a company distributing its products nationwide,
along with "rbST-free" claims, could theoretically encounter
fifty different sets of restrictive standards, raising fears that
10 3
varying state guidelines might not only inhibit free speech,
but carry with them the potential to unconstitutionally restrict interstate commerce.' 0 4 For instance, when Illinois
passed its 1994 law prohibiting the labeling of products as
100. See id. Suits against Swiss Valley Farms and the Pure Milk and Ice
Cream Company of Texas were both settled out of court. See also Growth Hormone for Cows Raises Health Questions, BUFFALO NEWS, Apr. 30, 1996, at B2
(indicating that under the terms of the settlement for the Texas company it was
reported that their practice of promoting their dairy products as BGH-free will
continue).
101. See THE HuMANE FARMING ASSOCIATION SPECIAL REPORT, THE BATTLE
AGAINST BGH, supra note 99, at 10.
102. Illinois, Hawaii, Nevada and Oklahoma passed laws prohibitingthe labeling of products as "rbST-free." See Beth Berselli, Settlement Reached In Hormone Labeling Case; Ben & Jerry's, States Agree Food Makers Can Indicate
Absence ofAdded Product,WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 1997, at A22, available in 1997
WL 12881480. Vermont passed a law mandating that products from cows
treated with rbST be labeled as such. See International Dairy Foods Ass'n v.
Amestoy, 898 F. Supp. 246 (D. Vt. 1995) rev'd, 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996).
103. For commercial speech to be protected under the First Amendment, it
must at least concern an activity that is lawful, must not be misleading, and the
governmental interest asserted as a rationale for restricting the speech must be
substantial. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). If these inquiries yield positive
responses, it must then be determined "whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest." Id.
104. The general rule governing such Commerce Clause inquiries has been
stated as follows: "Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." See Pike v. Bruce
Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960)).
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"rBGH-free," Ben & Jerry's Ice Cream dropped all of its
rBGH-free labeling, because it was financially infeasible for
the company to label its products differently for different
05
markets.
Vermont's regulations, which mandated the labeling of
products from treated animals, were challenged by trade
groups as unconstitutional in InternationalDairy FoodsAss'n
v. Amestoy. l0 6 Plaintiffs, relying upon the First Amendment
and the Commerce Clause, moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin Vermont from enacting section 2754 of Title 6
of the Vermont statutes which would have required retailers
to label milk products produced with rbST. 10 7 The court denied the motion, explaining that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that they would suffer irreparable harm without the
injunction. l0 8 Nor had they shown that it was likely that
their action could succeed upon its merits. 0 9
As to the First Amendment, the court ruled that the labeling required by the Vermont law was commercial speech,
which could be regulated because Vermont had narrowly tailored the law and demonstrated that it had a "substantial interest in informing consumers of the use of rbST." 110 The
court also noted that the law did not prohibit speech, but
rather mandated truthful disclosure."' The court rejected
105. See Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc. v. Lumpkin, No. 96-C-2748, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12469 (D. Ill. Aug. 27, 1996). Claiming violation of their First
Amendment rights, Ben and Jerry's brought suit against Illinois and the city of
Chicago when they were officially informed that marketing their products in
the state as "rBGH-free" would violate the Illinois Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act. See id. at *4.In August of 1997 a settlement was reached between Illinois
and the ice cream manufacturer and a coalition of organic food companies. See
Berselli, supra note 102, at A22. Under the terms of the settlement, the company will be permitted to advertise its products as "rBGH-free," but specific
compromise language was adopted by the parties. See id.
106. International Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 898 F. Supp. 246 (D. Vt.
1995) [hereinafter InternationalDairy Foods Ass'n 11.
107. See InternationalDairyFoods Ass'n I, 898 F. Supp. at 247. See also VT.
STAT. ANN.tit. vi § 2754 (1997) (this section was terminated on June 30, 1997,
because it caused irreparable harm to dairy manufacturers).
108. See id. at 251.
109. See id. at 251.
110. Id. at 253-54.
111. See id. at 251.
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the Commerce Clause argument, stating that the labeling
law represented a legitimate local interest; it was not preferential to in-state milk producers; and that it would have only
11 2
an incidental effect upon interstate commerce.
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court,
granting the injunction on First Amendment grounds. 1 13 The
court noted that the First Amendment protects not only free
speech, but the right not to speak, and that the labeling law
required the appellants to make an "involuntary statement"
about their products." 4 The loss of such a right would
amount to an irreparable injury, therefore an injunction was
warranted." 5 The court also found it likely that the appellants would succeed on the merits." 6 Vermont did not have a
"legitimate interest" in providing such information to its consumers."1 7 The court ruled that "consumer curiosity alone is
not a strong enough state interest to sustain the compulsion
of even ... [a] factual statement ...."118
In a ringing dissent, Judge Leval stated that Vermont's
concern over rbST's potential effects upon milk prices, local
farmers, and human/animal health was a legitimate state interest not to be dismissed as mere "curiosity." 1 9 Noting that
the Vermont law enforced compliance upon retailers and not
the plaintiff milk producers, 2 0 the Judge stated that the
First Amendment should not protect commercial speech
112. See id. at 251-52. Cf. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (North Carolina statute prohibiting interstate
shipments of apples from Washington State displaying that state's product
grades struck down as violating the Commerce Clause).
113. See International Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir.
1996) [hereinafter Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n III.
114. See Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n 11, 92 F.3d at 71.
115. See 92 F.3d at 71.
116. See id. at 72.
117. See id. at 74.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 75-78. Cf Grocery Manufacturers of America, Inc. v. Gerace, 755
F.2d 993, 1003-04 (2d Cir. 1985) (New York law requiring imitation cheese
products to be appropriately labeled as such on restaurant signs, menus and
containers is "intended to prevent deception and unfair competition [and] to
promote honesty and fair dealing," is a legitimate local interest, and constitutional under the Commerce Clause).
120. See Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n 11, 92 F.3d at 79.
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where "[tihe objective of the plaintiff ... is to conceal their
,,121 He added, "[tihe majoruse of rbST from consumers ....
stands the
ity's invocation of the First Amendment . .
12 2
Amendment on its ear."
3.

Post-Approval Reaction and Controversy

The approval of rbST prompted action from many
quarters. Pathmark, ShopRite, Kroger and 7-Eleven food
store chains avoided selling milk with rbST, 1 23 as did an estimated 300 grocery chains and dairies. 124 Over seventy school
districts nationwide adopted formal policies rejecting milk
from cows treated with rbST.' 2 5 Canada enacted a one year
moratorium on the sale and use of the product, 2 6 while Den127 Australia, 128
mark, Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands,
New Zealand and Argentina banned rbST. 129 The fifteen nations of the European Union banned the drug until the year
2000.130 The attorney generals from New York, Wisconsin,
121. Id. at 74.
122. Id.
123. See Hiss, supra note 13, at *2.
124. See Ian Jones, Farmer, Consumer Coalition to Develop Test for rBGH,
FOOD & DRINK DAILY, June 6, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, at *1.
125. THE BATTLE AGAINST BGH, supra note 99, at 10.
126. See Roberta Histed, Concerned Citizen's View: Worrisome Data on BST
Use Emerging, OTTAWA CITIZEN, July 2, 1995, at All [hereinafter Histed, Concerned Citizens]. See also OECD PredictsLarge Increase in U.S. BST Use, AGRA
EUROPE, Mar. 3, 1995, at E5 (indicating that the Canadian ban apparently did
not affect imports from countries where BGH use is permitted).
127. See Pratap Chatterjee, Environment:New Butter Faces Fearsof Cancer,
Gigantism, INTER PRESS SERVICE, August 18, 1995.
128. See FDA Says It Has No Authority to Ban BST Labeling, FOOD LABELING NEWS, Aug. 3, 1995 available in 1995 WL 8214442 [hereinafter FDA Says It
Has No Authority to Ban BST Labeling].
129. See Mark Thompson, The Earth Goes Global, 15 CA. LAW. 41 (1995) (citing Margaret Mellon of the Union of Concerned Scientists); see also Susan
Semenak, Stirring Up Fears of Spiked Milk; Nothing Wholesome About BST:
Critics, MONTREAL GAZETTE, May 13, 1995, at Al.

130. See Thompson, supra note 129, at 44. The European Commission later
agreed to permit U.S. dairy imports from treated cattle while continuing to forbid rBGH use in the EU. See Alison Maitland, Trade Row Looms Over Maize,
FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Sept. 4, 1996, at 3. However, in June of 1997, despite
intense lobbying by Monsanto, a European Union (EU) proposal to defer worldwide approval of rBGH for another two years was accepted by the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the United Nations food standards committee. See
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and Texas called for mandatory labeling of rbST-related
products. 13 1 A ninety-day moratorium on use of the product
in the U.S. passed through Congress right after FDA
approval.132
The controversy was, in part, focused directly on the FDA
itself, which has been criticized for treating the bio-tech industry preferentially. 3 3 Some view the agency "as little
more than an 'industry cheerleader."' 34 Others have described the FDA as a drug approval agency, as opposed to a
drug review agency,' 3 5 and an organization with a "moral
weakness" at its top, 13 6 "more interested in protecting the in13 7
terests of Monsanto than the interests of consumers."
EU/Codex Alimentarius: EU Stands Its Ground on Milk Hormones, AGRI-INDUSTRY EUROPE, July 4, 1997.
131. See Anonymous FDA Whistleblowers Spark CongressionalProbeof BST,
FOOD LABELING NEWS, Apr. 21, 1994, available in 1994 WL 2550919, at *1
[hereinafter Anonymous FDA Whistleblowers].
132. See Buss, supra note 20, at *2.
133. See Maher, supra note 33, at 147. See also FDCA, 21 U.S.C. at § 335a
(f)(1) (indicating that "the Secretary... may ... refuse by order... to approve
any abbreviated drug application ... if a significant question has been raised
regarding the integrity of the approval process.
134. See Maher, supra note 33, at 195.
135. See Beiswenger, supra note 4, at 676-77 (citing FDA Accused by Ex-Official; Yielding to Industry Alleged, CHEM. MARKETING REP., Jan. 15, 1990, at 3
(quoting Dr. Richard Burroughs)).
136. See John Schwartz, Probe of 3 FDA Officials Sought; Industry Ties
Before Approval of Bovine Growth Hormone Are at Issue, WASH. POST, Apr. 19,
1994, at A3.
137. See Anonymous FDA Whistleblowers, supra note 131, at *3 (quoting
U.S. Representative Bernie Sanders).
Commentators have described situations where an administrative agency
is in effect "captured" by the industry it regulates. See Allan Kanner, Environmental and Toxic Tort Issues, 127 ALI-ABA 775, 797, and n.50 (1995) (citing
Ziem & Castleman, Threshold Limit Values: Historical Perspectives and Current Practice, J. OccuP. MED., Nov. 1989, 910 (referring to Occupational Safety
and Health Act (OSHA)). This "phenomena" has been noted to occur in situations where the agency has the simultaneous objectives of both promoting and
regulating the industry. See Marshall v. Consumers Power Co., 237 N.W.2d
266, 279-80 (1975) (referring to the Atomic Energy Commission as being formed
to "fulfill the often conflicting goals of both regulating and promoting nuclear
energy"). See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative
Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARv. L. REV. 916, 978 (1988) ("empirical worries
arise about the susceptibility of various agencies to influence by powerful private groups").
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In March of 1994, four months after rbST had been approved, an anonymous letter, circulated by FDA employees,
once again raised the issue of bias in the FDA approval process. 13 8 In response, three congressmen once again requested
the GAO to investigate. 139 The employee letter specifically
implicated three former Monsanto employees-turned FDA
employees, all of whom were involved in various aspects of
the FDA's rbST approval process. 140 The employees included
Margaret Miller, Michael Taylor and Susan Sechen. Ms.
Miller, deputy director of the FDA's Office of New Animal
Drugs,1 41 participated in the rbST review process while conThe potential problem of agency "capture" is exacerbated by three general

factors in the case of the FDA and rbST. First, a decision by the FDA not to
take enforcement action with respect to a presumed violation of the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act would be presumptively unreviewable by a court under the
Administrative Procedure Act. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837-38
(1985).
Second, even if an FDA action with respect to rbST was reviewable, the
court would be highly deferential to the agency. See Baltimore Gas & Electric
Co. v. National Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983) (explaining
that when an agency makes a scientific prediction "within its area of special
expertise, at the frontiers of science.., a reviewing court must generally be at
its most deferential").
Third, it is the formal policy of the United States to promote the use and
increased use of dairy products. See Dairy Promotion Program, 7 C.F.R.
§ 1150.139 (1996) (authorizing the National Dairy Promotion Board to "promote
the use of fluid milk and dairy products"); see also Agricultural Act of 1959, 7
U.S.C. § 1446b (1997) (providing that "it is the policy of Congress ...to promote
the increased use of [dairy products]"). Note, however, that the latter statute
states that it is also Congressional policy to encourage "farmers to develop...
disease-free cattle ... and to stabilize the economy of dairy farmers." Id.
Admittedly, the FDA is particularly susceptible to criticism from both sides
of the regulatory aisle. On the one hand, the agency may be viewed as being
composed of "slow, unimaginative bureaucrats who are intent on disapproving
drugs so as to avoid criticism by Congressional committees," while on the other
hand, the agency may be criticized for its "personal allegiance to the medical
profession and the drug industry.., quick to approve new drugs without adequate evidence for safety.. .slow and inept in withdrawing drugs from the market." See Richard J. Crout, The Nature of Regulatory Choices, 33 FOOD, DRUG &
CosM. L.J. 413 (1978) cited in Hurr & MERRILL, supra note 55, at 586.
138. See Anonymous FDA Whistleblowers, supra note 131, at *1.
139. See id.
140. See id. at *1-2.
141. See id.
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currently publishing papers with Monsanto scientists. 142 Mr.
Taylor, a former Monsanto attorney who advised the company on food labeling issues, became the FDA's deputy commissioner for policy. 14 3 Later, according to the congressional
letter to the GAO, he "approved and signed the FDA's labeling guidelines thereby justifying the FDA's policy prohibiting
the labeling of milk produced with rBGH." 44 Ms. Sechen,
also implicated, worked as a graduate research assistant for
45
bST pioneer and Monsanto consultant, Dale E. Bauman.1
Ms. Sechen reviewed rbST data for the FDA while simultaneously participating in BST research projects reportedly spon1 46
sored by Monsanto at Cornell University.
But, in October of 1994, the GAO vindicated the three
FDA officials. 1 47 At the same time, a USDHHS inspector general report expressed disapproval towards Monsanto for illegally promoting the drug prior to its approval.' 4 8 The FDA
has been accused of not only allowing, but also participating
142. See id. at *3. It was also reported that Ms. Miller, while with the FDA,
"increased the antibiotic protocol for milk to permit an increase of 10,000 percent." MONSANTO: Dr. Virginia Weldon "Top Candidate"to Become Commissioner of the FDA, M2 PRESSWIRE, May 27, 1997, available in 1997 WL
10370482.
143. See Anonymous FDA Whistleblowers, supra note 131, at *1.
144. Id. Around the end of 1995, Mr. Taylor left his job at the FDA and
assumed a position with the USDA. See id; see also Telephone Interview with
Mary Cottone, Administrative Assistant, Policy, Food and Drug Administration
(Jan. 8, 1997). Soon after he reportedly returned to employment in the private
sector. See id.
145. See Letter from Bernie Sanders, U.S. Representative, to Charles Bowsher, Comptroller General, U.S. General Accounting Office (Apr. 15, 1994) (on
file with the Federal Document Clearing House), available in 1994 WL
14179415; see also Elizabeth Doran, GAO Probes Allegations of Tainted BST
Review, POST-STANDARD, Oct. 17, 1994 at Al.

146. See Anonymous FDA Whistleblowers, supra note 131, at *3. But see Doran, supra note 145 (quoting Dale E. Bauman stating that the USDA, not Monsanto, funded all of Sechen's research).
147. The General Accounting Office report, while noting certain "institutional failings" on the part of the FDA, found no conflicts of interest. See GAO
Says Taylor Had No Conflict of Interest in BST Approval, FOOD LABELING
NEWS, Nov. 3, 1994 available in 1994 WL 2727976. Because of time limitations
the report did not address whether the FDA's approval process was biased. See
id.
148. See Ridgeway, supra note 80, at 29.
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in the process. 14 9 Just one month later, an official within
Canada's Bureau of Veterinary Drugs charged that Monsanto
had offered the Canadian government up to two million dollars if it would approve rbST "without being required to submit data from any further studies or trials."15 °
Additionally, some rbST endorsements contained unusually strong partisan tenors. Some were curiously, perhaps
more than coincidentally, similar. For instance, the Journal
of the American Medical Association suggested the following:
"health professionals can play an important role in reassuring the public about the safety of milk and refuting misstatements or misconceptions about bST."1 51
149. See BRADLEY MILLER & JOHN C. STAUBER, THE HUMANE FARMING AssoCIATION, COMMENTS ON THE VOLUNTARY LABELING OF MILK AND MILK PRODUCTS
FROM Cows NOT TREATED WITH RECOMBINANT BoviNE GROWTH HORMONE 1, 2
(Mar. 10, 1994). The USDA has also been accused of unlawfully promoting
rbST prior to its approval. See generally Cordes v. Madigan, No. 90-2929, 1992
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6250 (D. D.C. Apr. 30, 1992).
150. Ridgeway, supra note 80, at 29. See also FDCA, 21 U.S.C. at § 335c
(a)(1) ("[tlhe Secretary shall withdraw approval of an abbreviated drug application if the Secretary finds that the approval was obtained, expedited or otherwise facilitated through bribery [or] payment of an illegal gratuity...").

151. William H. Daughaday, M.D. & David M. Barbano, Ph.D., Bovine Somatotropin Supplementation of Dairy Cows... Is the Milk Safe?, JAMA, Aug.
22/29, 1990, at 1005 [hereinafter Daughaday & Barbanol. The AMA's support
of rbST, while inexplicable in the respect that there were no health-related reasons to do so, may be partially explained by the fact that the association received a grant from Monsanto for television education programs promoting its
use. See Neal D. Barnard, AMA Endorsements Raise Questions About Ethics
and the Medical Profession, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 19, 1997, at B9. The AMA
has also received educational grants from the Beef Board and the National
Livestock and Meat Board. See id.
Interestingly enough, the FDA has formally expressed its concern that
"companies may influence the content of educational programs not only directly
... but indirectly through the nature of the relationship between the company
and also the provider (e.g., if the provider believes that future financial support
from the company depends upon producing programs that promote the company's products) ....

[T]he goal of the agency [is] to ensure that scientific and

educational activities that are not intended to be promotional are designed to be
truly independent from promotional influence by the marketers .... " See Draft
Policy Statement on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Activities,
57 Fed. Reg. 56,412, 56,412-413 (1992) [hereinafter Draft Policy Statement].
Perhaps more interesting still is that this policy statement was drafted by none
other than Michael R. Taylor. See Draft Policy Statement, 57 Fed. Reg. at
56,414. See also supra text accompanying notes 143-44.
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C. Everett Koop issued a statement suggesting: "Supermarkets and dairy processors can play an important role by
assuring consumers of the safety of the milk supply, by providing facts on BST to interested customers, or by referring
them to credible health and nutrition authorities."1 52 The
American Dietetic Association, while generally approving of
biotechnology, appeared to issue a more neutral opinion:
"Biotechnology needs only to be explained, not to be promoted. Because of consumer apprehensions about biotechnology, explanations of the risks and benefits of biotechnology
15 3
should include assurances of regulatory control.'
III.

The Adverse Effects of rbST on Cows

Monsanto states that the health of rbST treated cows
will be similar to that of other high milk producing animals.1 54 The USDHHS reported that the FDA found evidence of only "slightly increased incidence of mastisis" in
treated cows. 15 5 The NIH reported that
well managed, rbST-treated cows ... probably experience
no greater health problems than untreated cows producing
the same amounts of milk .... [Any] additional effects of
rbST on health of the dairy cow appear to be minimal ....
There is no compelling evidence of increased incidence of
156
foot and leg problems or metabolic disease.
152. C. Everett Koop, supra note 24.
153. THE AMERICAN DIETETIC ASSOCIATION, Position of The American Die-

tetic Association: "Biotechnology and the Future of Food, J. Am. Dietetic Ass'n
(1992). It is to be noted that the association has come under fire for pursuing
contributions from groups like the National Livestock and Meat Board. See
Marian Burros, Dietetic Association Risks Image by Cuddling Up to Food
Groups, N.Y. TIMES NEWS SERVICE, reported in PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Nov. 28,
1995. Also questionable is its relationship with Monsanto, which hired the
group to respond to consumer questions about rbST. See id.
154. MONSANTO COMPANY, QUESTIONS MOST ASKED By PRODUCERS, Promotional Pamphlet, n.d..
155. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 85.
156. National Institutes of Health, Technology Assessment Conference
Statement, Bovine Somatotropin 8 (Dec. 5-7, 1990) [hereinafter NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH].
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Yet, a variety of other sources disagree, including the GAO,
which found a "much higher incidence of mastisis occurring
in cows treated with rBGH."'15 7 Consumers Union, reportedly
using the FDA's own data, cited a seventy-nine percent increase in mastisis attributable to the drug's use. 158 Another
study, using Monsanto's data, found a nineteen percent in15 9
crease in mastisis.
An insert Monsanto provides to veterinarians, describes
0
twenty-one potential side effects which might be expected.16
It has been reported that rbST use in cows increases the likelihood of cystic ovaries, reproductive disorders, weight loss,
fever, twisted stomachs, digestive disorders, lesions, lacerations of knees and feet, spontaneous abortions and even
death. 16 1 Cows may experience decreased immune functions, 16 2 higher rates of stress 163 internal bleeding, 16 4 swelling at the injection site, 165 enlargement of internal organs,
increased intolerance to heat, higher rates of metabolic disease.166 The use of rbST double the likelihood of hoof rot and
uterine infections, and treated cows experience retained pla16 7
centas and ketosis at three or four times the normal rate.
Presumably, these ailments are present in "untreated cows
producing the same amounts of milk."168 The FDA, in ap157. Ridgeway, supra note 80, at 28.
158. See id. at 31.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 30.
161. See Andrea Maenza, Bovine Growth Hormone Unwanted, But May Be
Approved in Canada, TAKE ACTION, Spring, 1995, at 1.
162. See Beiswenger, supra note 4, at 683 (citing Matthew H. Shulman, Bovine Growth Hormone: Who Wins? Who Loses? What's at Stake?, AGRICULTURAL
BIOETHICS 111, at 121 (Steven M. Glendel, et. al, eds. 1990)).
163. See Paul McKeague, Whelan Lobbies to Ban Hormone, WINDSOR STAR,
Apr. 6, 1995, at F6.
164. See Robert Gavin, New Hormone Dangerous to Cows, Farmers Charge
FDA Says Few Problems Reported Among 3 Million Cows Injected, SYRACUSE
HERALD AM., Mar. 26, 1995, at G1.
165. See Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n 11, 92 F.3d at 78.
166. See THE HUMANE FARMING ASSOCIATION, SPECIAL REPORT, BoviNE
GROWTH HORMONE 1 (1991) [hereinafter THE HUMANE FARMING ASSOCIATION,
BoviNE GROWTH HORMONE].

167. See Hiss, supra note 13, at 10.
168. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, supra note 156, at 8.
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proving rbST, had determined that the risks to cattle were
"manageable." 16 9 During the first year of rbST use, the FDA
compiled 806 adverse reaction reports. 170 While statistically
this is but a tiny percentage of the number of cows injected
with the drug, there is reason to believe this number may not
17
be a true indicator of the number of adverse reactions. '
IV.
A.

Potential Effects on Human Health

Antibiotics

The primary concern of some rbST opponents regarding
the potential impact of the drug upon human health is, coincidentally, relative to its primary impact upon animal health.
This impact is the drug's potential to spur higher rates of
mastisis in cows. Mastisis is a painful bacterial infection of
the udder which is related to the increased demand placed on
the cow to produce milk.' 72 It causes the cows to excrete pus
169. Stauber v. Kessler, 895 F. Supp. 1178, 1183 (W.D. Wis. 1995).
170. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, FOOD &

DRUG
ADMINISTRATION, FDA TALK PAPER No. T95-14, BST UPDATE: FIRST YEAR EXPERIENCE REPORTS 2 (1995) [hereinafter USDHHS, BST UPDATE]. The FDA later

explained that only 496 of the 806 adverse reactions were related to rbST. See
Robert Steyer, FDA Says Cow Drug is Safe, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 22,
1995, at 1E. A follow-up survey covering the period between February 1 to August 25, 1995 revealed 509 reports of adverse reactions, 392 of which the agency
claimed were "possibly associated" with rbST use. See id. A twenty-four month
summary of adverse reactions to rbST, covering the period from February 4,
1994 through February 4, 1996, reported 1,438 reactions, 918 of which the
agency states were "possibly" associated with rbST use. See FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, CENTER FOR VETERINARY MEDICINE, CVM UPDATE, Two YEAR REPORT ON BST 1 (1996). RbST use accounted for nearly half of all reported cattle
deaths, but less than five percent of the reported incidents of mastisis due to
overall animal drug administration. See id.
171. The FDA encourages users to report such reactions to Monsanto or to
their veterinarians, as well as the agency. See USDHHS- FDA, BST UPDATE,
supra note 170, at 2. It may be unrealistic, or even unfair, to assume that a
rural vet will regularly make reports to the FDA, or that a company like Monsanto can be asked to voluntarily and accurately report data that could jeopardize a $1/2 billion investment. See also Wisconsin Democrats Ask FDA to
Address Alleged BGH Inconsistencies, FOOD LABELING NEws, Dec. 7, 1995,
available in 1995 WL 11335046 (citing examples where Monsanto did not report adverse reactions to the FDA); Steyer, supra note 170, at 1E (quoting Dr.
Stephen Sundlof, director of the FDA's Center for Veterinary Medicine, con-

firming that adverse reactions are under-reported).
172. See Kulka & Semenak, supra note 2, at 10.
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into the milk, making the milk unusable. 17 3 Because cows
with mastisis do not produce sellable milk, the infection must
be treated with antibiotics. 174 Opponents of rbST fear that
higher levels of antibiotics can therefore be expected to appear in milk.
An animal's constant exposure to antibiotics 75 can cause
certain bacteria to develop a resistance which they are able to
pass on, not only to their offspring, but to any bacteria with
which they may come into contact. 176 If exposed to still more
antibiotics, these bacteria may be generated into
"supergerms" resistant to some of medicine's most potent antibiotic cures. 177 Furthermore, humans can assimilate these
resistant bacteria by eating contaminated animal foods or
even by eating foods grown from soil fertilized with manure
from antibiotic-treated animals. 178 The problem is compounded by the fact that in some cases humans and animals
are administered the same general types of antibiotics. 17 9 As
early as 1984, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) estab173. See McKeague, supra note 163, at F6.
174. See FDA Sees BST as Safe for Humans, Udderly Problematical for
Bovines, BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWSWATCH, Dec. 18, 1989, at 9. Mastisis primarily

occurs because today's dairy cows are bred and fed to produce as much as seven
times more milk than they did half a century ago. See Histed, Concerned Citizens, supra note 126, at All. In effect, the cows' systems are already stressed to
the point that they become sick, and rbST promises to magnify this problem.
Id. It is to be noted that while beyond the scope of this article, the animal
rights issues presented by rbST use are significant.
175. It is estimated that during the early 1980's over 12 million pounds of
antibiotics were fed to poultry and livestock, amounting to approximately forty
percent of the total amount of antibiotics produced in the United States during
that period. See Susan Okie, Experts Urge Steps to Stem Antibiotic Resistance,
WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 1997, at 207 (quoting Morton N. Swartz, professor of
medicine, Harvard Medical School). See also N. Rehmatullah, M.D., Antibiotics
Give Profits, Cures and the Unkillable, PLAIN DEALER, June 10, 1997, at 8B
(indicating that antibiotics are placed in animal feed in order to "eliminate lowlevel bacterial colonies in animal intestines, allowing less food to be absorbed
more efficiently," thereby promoting growth).
176. See Challem, supra note 14, at 56.
177. Id.
178. See Barbara O' Brien, Animal Welfare Reform and the Magic Bullet: The
Use and Abuse of SubtherapeuticDoses of Antibiotics in Livestock, 67 U. COLO.
L. REV. 407, 426 (1996).

179. See Rehmatullah, supra note 175, at 8B (stating that the "research
shows that cross-resistance in animals and humans is dramatic and startling.").
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lished a link between antibiotic administration to animals
and antibiotic resistance in humans. 8 0 The CDC has stated
that the development of human resistance to antibiotics rep1 81
resents "a major public health crisis."
In the United States, about 19,000 people die each year
82
from infections which are resistant to antibiotic therapy.
83
The problem, however, is by no means confined to America,
and the costs of treating patients with multidrug-resistant
180. See O'Brien, supra note 178, at 425. See also Drug Resistance: MultiDrug Resistant Salmonella Typhimurium, DISEASE WEEKLY PLUS, Feb. 10 1997,
at 1 (Information Access Co., Charles W. Henderson) (indicating antibiotic resistant strains of Salmonella have developed, possibly due to "intensive animal
husbandry"); What's The Worst That Could Happen, GENESIS REPORT-Rx,
Aug.1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10364806 [hereinafter GENESIS REPORT] (antibiotic resistant strains of E. coli and Shigella bacteria are believed to be associated with antibiotic administration to poultry and animals).
181. See Hiss, supra note 13, at 10. Accord Challem, supra note 14 (quoting
Stephen Sundlof, D.V.M, Ph.D., of the FDA's Center for Veterinary Medicine,
stating that resistance to antibiotics is "one of the most significant problems
facing human and veterinary medicine"); BMA Reveals New Guidelines for Antibiotics, MARKETLETTER , Nov. 10, 1997 (Information Access Co., Industry Express, United Kingdom) [hereinafter BMA Reveals New Guidelines]. The
British Medical Association warned that increasing resistance to antibiotics is a
major public threat. See id.
182. See Challem, supra note 14, at 56. See e.g., Okie, supra note 175, at 206
(twenty-five percent of Streptococcus pheumoniae bacteria, which cause meningitus, pneumonia and ear infections, are penicillin-resistant); BMA Reveals
New Guidelines, supra note 181 ("cases of multidrug-resistant salmonella have
increased ten-fold in the past six years"); GENESIS REPORT, supra note 180 (E.
coli bacteria now resistant to up to six different antibiotics); Old Killer May
Inspire New Fears, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 23, 1997, at Al (twelve percent of
patients with tuberculosis are resistant to at least one drug); Drug Resistance:
Resistance Increasing in Gram-PositiveBacteria,Disease Weekly Plus (Charles
W. Henderson) Sept. 30, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10364195 (Vancomycinresistant enterococci now resistant to almost all available antibiotics); The National Science and Technology Council on Emerging and Re-Emerging Infectious Diseases, 22 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 175 (1996), available in 1996 WL
13524573 (staphylococcal infections now respond consistently to only one
antibiotic).
183. See e.g., Incurable TB May Hit Epidemic, Reuters, reported in CHic.
TRiu., Oct. 23, 1997, at 17 ("the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the International Union Against Tuberculosis and Lung Disease found
multi-drug resistant TB in one-third of 35 countries surveyed."); Rehmatullah,
supra note 175, at 8B (European use of Avoparcin in animals linked to human
resistance to Vancomycin); Drug Resistance:Antibiotic Misuse Causing Frightening New Bugs, DISEASE WEEKLY PLUS, Sept. 8, 1997 (Information Access Co.)
available in 1997 WL 13677678. European doctors report multidrug resistant
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infections can be staggering.18 4 Furthermore, it is estimated
that the development of one new antibiotic can cost upwards
of $300 million, while there may be less than a dozen individuals worldwide considered to be true experts on antibiotic
resistance.'8 5
However, the FDA concluded that the existing system
gauging milk purity, as far as antibiotics were concerned, was
sufficient to ensure that any increase in the use of antibiotics
would present no dangers to human health.' 86 The FDA
based its conclusion on the fact that every tanker of milk produced in the United States is currently tested by industry for
the most common drugs used to treat mastisis, beta-lactum
drugs.18 7 In addition, ninety percent of all producers voluntarily submit to additional milk safety standards. 8 8 The FDA
also conducts random drug residue tests, but leaves primary
control of milk product safety to the states, 8 9 whose regulators routinely test for four different antibiotic residues. 90
However, some feel that the FDA has traditionally
demonstrated a certain laxness in regards to industry's use of
antibiotics. For instance, antibiotic-resistant "marker"
strain of S. aureus and a resistant strain of a fungus, Aspergillus, which can
cause fatal lung congestion. See id.
184. See Barbara Benson, Resistant Bugs Cost Big Bucks at N.YC. Hospitals: $500 Million a Year Spent to Fight Staph; Study May Mobilize Health Care
Payers, CRAIN's N.Y. Bus., June 9, 1997, at 3 (pointing out that "[t]he direct cost
of fighting antibiotic-resistant infections" in New York City hospitals amounted
to $435.5 million in 1995 alone); Tim Zimmermann, Fighting TB: A Second
Chance To Do It Right, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 31, 1997, at 45 (treating
one case of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis, likened to "Ebola with wings," can
cost $250,000) (quoting Richard Bumgarner, deputy director of the World
Health Organization's Global TB Program).
185. See Rehmatullah, supra note 175, at 8B. Half of these experts are reported to be nearing retirement. See id.
186. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, FOOD & DRUG
ADMINISTRATION, FDA BACKGROUNDER, NEW ANIMAL DRUG FOR INCREASING
MILK PRODUCTION, at 2.
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, supra note 156, at 5.

190. See Challem, supra note 14, at 56. Accord Stauber v. Kessler, 895 F.
Supp. 1178, 1184 (W.D. Wisc. 1995). See also Ridgeway, supra note 80, at 32
(FDA spot checks for twelve different antibiotic residues).
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genes' 9 1 had already been used in dozens of genetically engineered crops by the time the FDA began a review to determine whether the genes could increase a human's resistance
to the beneficial effects of antibiotics. 19 2 Of much greater concern is the fact that milk products may permissibly contain
any one of eighty antibiotics currently used by the industry. 193 In 1989, a Wall Street Journal study found antibiotic
residues in thirty-eight percent of the milk samples it
94
tested.1
B.

IGF-1

Another major concern is the effect rbST may have on
another hormone, Insulin-like Growth Factor-1 (IGF-1), and
the potential impact this substance may have on humans.
Both natural human growth hormone and natural bovine
growth hormone stimulate and regulate the production of
(natural) IGF-1, a hormone bound to proteins, which is present (and virtually identical) in both human and bovine
milk. 195 IGF-1 regulates cell growth in adults and infants 196
19 7
and in turn may mediate the actions of growth hormone.
The FDA reported "that rbST does not increase the IGF-1
content above levels normally found in milk of non-treated
animals." 198 The NIH stated, "[mlilk from rbST-treated cows
contains higher concentrations of IGF-1. "19 9 Researchers who
191. Typically, the DNA of a desired trait is linked with an antibiotic gene
(the "marker") and transferred to a group of recipient cells. See Bohrer, supra
note 72, at 671-73 (1994). Cells which are not transformed by the genetic process are destroyed by the antibiotic, while cells successfully transformed express the DNA of both the desired trait and its antibiotic marker. See id. This
enables the genetic scientist to isolate these cells, extract them, and use them to
create organisms which will assume not only the desired characteristics of the
transferred gene, but resistance to the antibiotic marker as well. See id.
192. See Barnum, supra note 18, at Dl.
193. See Challem, supra note 14, at 57.
194. See Hiss, supra note 13, at 10.
195. See Samuel S. Epstein, A Needless New Risk of Breast Cancer, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 20, 1994, at 5, available in 1994 WL 2146663.
196. Id.
197. See USDHHS, FDA VETERINARIAN, supra note 69, at 7.
198. Id. at 8.
199. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, supra note 156, at 9.
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seem to have the respect of both proponents and opponents
report that "[m]ean amounts of IGF-1 in the milk of treated
cows were always higher than those found in the controls."20 0
Still others point to Monsanto's own data as quantifying an
eight-fold increase in IGF-1, attributable to rbST
20 1
injections.
After conducting a study, the FDA concluded that rbST's
possible effect on IGF-1, and IGF-I's potential to affect
human health, 20 2 was not an issue for several reasons. First,
the amount of IGF-1 found in untreated cows normally varies
greatly, and the amount found in treated cows was within the
range of that found in human milk. 20 3 Second, there was no
evidence that IGF-1 is biologically active in man. 20 4 Third,
studies in animals indicated that IGF-1 had no oral toxic-

200. See Judith C. Juskevich & C. Greg Guyer, Bovine Growth Hormone:
Human Food Safety Evaluation, 249 SCIENCE 875, 882 (Aug. 24, 1990).
201. See Roberta Histed, Synthetic Hormones in Milk Haven't Been Proven
Safe, OTTAWA CITIZEN, June 23, 1995, at A10 [hereinafter Histed, Synthetic
Hormones].
202. The conclusion that FDA approval can be equated with product safety
was questioned by the GAO, who conducted a study of 198 drugs approved by
the agency over a ten year period. See Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n, 92 F.3d at 77
(Leval, J., dissenting). It was found that over half of these drugs had "serious
post approval risks" requiring either "labeling changes or withdrawal from the
market." Id. Judge Leval writing in dissent concluded: "[A] government
agency's conclusion regarding a product's safety, reached after limited study, is
not a guarantee and does not invalidate public concern for unknown side effects." Id. (citing GAO REPORT: FDA DRUG REVIEW: POSTAPPROVAL RisKs, 19761985, Apr. 1990, at 2-3).
203. See Juskevich & Guyer, supra note 200, at 882-883.
204. See Daughaday & Barbano, supra note 151, at 1003. See also Letter
from Linda A. Grassie, Communications and Education Branch, Center for Veterinary Medicine, Food and Drug Administration, to the author (Oct. 25, 1995)
(indicating that the FDA based its conclusion in part on studies done in the
1950's where BST was injected into humans).

31

634

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

ity.205 Finally, IGF-1 is destroyed by the heat process used to
20 6
prepare infant formula made with milk.
Despite significant scientific evidence which indicates
that IGF-1 is harmless to humans, 20 7 a small group of scien208
tists and researchers claim there is a link between cancer
and ingesting the milk from rbST treated cows, 20 9 and that
2 10
female fetuses and infants may be particularly at risk.
205. See Juskevich & Guyer, supra note 200, at 883. The FDA's findings
were based on a Monsanto study conducted with rats which lasted two weeks
and found no oral toxicity. See Stauber v. Kessler, 895 F. Supp. 1178, 1192
(W.D. Wis. 1995). Cf. Barry Commoner, The Hazards of Risk Assessment, 14
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 365, 371-72 (1989). Mr. Commoner's views of the use of
animal studies to assess risk are instructive. The author cites as an example
the potent carcinogen aminoacetyl fluorene which, when fed to rats, produces
cancer. See id. When fed to guinea pigs, however, no cancer is produced. Id. If
the chemical is fed to people, will they react like rats or like guinea pigs? The
answer is disturbing: Because of the vast inherent differences between the
human population and a controlled animal population, some people may react
like rats, others like guinea pigs. Id. This at least suggests the potential for
dangerous inaccuracies in toxicity studies based upon animal experiments. But
cf. Prop. Rules, Sponsored Compounds in Food Producing Animals, 50 Fed. Reg.
45530, 45542 (1985) (citing the reliability of animal bioassays despite their "inherent limitations and uncertainties"). See also Nitrofurans, 56 Fed. Reg. at
41,905 (factors such as "age, hormonal status, physical stress and immunologic
competence" may affect cancer rates and "cannot be controlled in either the target animal population fed (a drug) or in the human population that eats food
products derived from these animals."); See also FUNK, supra note 56, at 486.
"Animal studies are subject to conflicting interpretations particularly concerning how the results should be extrapolated to determine human consequences."
Id.
206. See Daughaday & Barbano, supra note 151, at 1005. The American
Medical Association seems to agree with the FDA, that the heat process used to
prepare baby formula destroys all IGF-1. Id. However, the NIH did not concur
with these findings and reported that as much as ten percent of the hormone
might remain after treatment. See NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, supra
note 156, at 7.
207. Reportedly as many as 2,000 studies have concluded that rbST is not
harmful to human beings. See FDA Says It Has No Authority to Ban BST Labeling, supra note 128 (referring to statements made by Richard Durbin, U.S.
Representative).
208. IGF-1 may have a direct stimulating affect upon cancer cells. See Linda
Gasparello, Is... BST Alarm a Tempest in a Milk Glass, FooD & DRINK DAILY,
Aug. 9, 1995 (citing former cancer researcher George Tritsch).
209. See generally Histed, Synthetic Hormones, supra note 201, A10. See
also Epstein, supra note 195, at 5.
210. See Amy O'Connor, BGH Linked to Cancer in Humans, VEGETARIAN
TIMES, Mar. 1, 1995, at 18 (citing Samuel Epstein) (intestinal walls of children
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One scientist warns that IGF-1 could engender premature
growth in infants. 2 11 Another demonstrated that IGF-1 has
"a direct growth-promoting action on fetal cells." 2 12 Researchers are worried about cell division in the bowel and
rbST's role in promoting colon cancer in humans. 2 13 Still
others cite IGF-l's "wide spectrum of physiological and renal
effects," 2 14 and the roles it plays in diseases and conditions
such as acromegaly (a disease which enlarges the human extremities), 2 15 glucose intolerance and hypertension, 21 6 thyroid tumors, 2 17 diabetic kidney disease (nephropathy), 21 8 and
219
polycystic ovary syndrome.
While it has been argued that IGF-1, as a "protein hormone," is harmlessly digested in the gut,22 0 some feel the horor infants may be more permeable than those of adults, and may more readily
absorb IGF-1). Accord Bonnie Liebman, Crying Over Milk, 19 NUTRITION AcTION HEALTH LETrER 10 (1992), at 7. See also Frank Murray, Hormone For
Cows May Cause Human Cancer,BETrER NUTRITION FOR TODAY'S LIVING, Nov.
1995, at 8 [hereinafter Murray] (citing former cancer researcher George Tritsch
as claiming that IGF-1 levels can affect the progress of leukemia in children).
211. See Epstein, supra note 195, at 5 ("breast tissues of female fetuses and
infants are sensitive to hormonal influences").
212. See Sara V.R. Carlsson-Skwirut, Abstract, The Biosynthesis of Somatomedins and Their Role in the Fetus, 279 ACTA ENDOCRINOL SUPPLEMENT

82-85 (Copenhagen, 1986) available in LEXIS, Medline Database.
213. See McKeague, supra note 163, at F6.
214. See G.D. Ogle, et al., Abstract, Renal Effects of Growth Hormone,
PEDIATR. NEPHROL. (Austl.) Sep. 1992; 6 (5): 483-9, available in LEXIS, Medline
Database.
215. See generally S. Ezzat, Abstract, Hepatobiliary and Gastrointestinal
Manifestations ofAcromegaly, DIG. Dis. (Switz.) 1992; 10 (3): 173-80, available
in LEXIS, Medline Database.
216. See THE HUMANE FARMING ASSOCIATION, BOVINE GROWTH HORMONE,
supra note 166, at 3.
217. See G.A. Thomas, E.D. Williams, Abstract, Evidence for and Possible
Mechanisms of Non-Genotoxic Carcinogenesis in the Rodent Thyroid, MUTAT.
RES. (Wales) June 1991; 248 (2): 357-70, availablein LEXIS, Medline Database.
218. See M. Krawczuk-Rybak, M. Urban, Abstract, The Role of Growth Hormone in the Development of Complications in Insulin-Dependent Diabetes,
PADATR. GRENZGEB (Germany)1991; 30 (3): 237-43, available in LEXIS, Medline Database.
219. See R. Kazar, Abstract, The Etiology of Polycystic Ovary Syndrome,
MED. HYPOTHESES, (Eng.) Nov. 1989; 30 (3): 151-5, availablein LEXIS, Medline
Database.
220. See Bohrer, supra note 191, at 677-79.
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mone can survive the digestive process. 2 2 1 Milk treated with
rbST may contain IGF-1 not bound to casein-carrier proteins,
possibly making the hormone more potent, and more biologically active in humans. 22 2 The FDA unequivocally denies
that there is any link between the consumption of IGF-1 and
22 3
cancer, or any other human disease.
Another barely discernable issue is that it appears that
the FDA merely selected IGF-1 for study from a number of
hormones affected by rbST. 22 4 One source reports that milk
from rbST injected cows was found to contain other hormones
22 5
"in amounts up to 1,000 times greater than normal levels."
In short, significant questions regarding the possible effects
2 26
of IGF-1 may remain unanswered.
V.

RbST's Potential Effect on the Dairy Industry

No small issue is the potential for rbST's introduction to
create havoc in the dairy industry, speeding up a process
which is currently putting small and mid-size farmers out of
business and devastating rural economies. 2 27 There is an
221. See Murray, supra note 210. See also Chatterjee, supra note 127 (citing
C. Xian, BRIT. J. ENDOCRINOLOGY, Aug. 1995) (IGF-I may not be harmlessly digested when combined with casein, the principle protein in cow's milk);
O'Connor, supra note 210, at 18.
222. See Histed, Synthetic Hormones, supra note 201, at A10.
223. See USDHHS, FDA VETERINARIAN, supra note 69, at 7.
224. See Juskevich & Guyer, supra note 200, at 883.
225. See THE HUMANE FARMING ASSOCIATION, BovINE GROWTH HORMONE
supra note 166, at 3. See also JAMA, supra note 91, at 1389 ("blood hormone
levels in cows are increased up to 1200-fold by rbST").
226. RbST proponents are among those citing the lack of knowledge regarding the drug's potential affects upon humans over the long term. See NATIONAL
INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, supra note 156, at 9 ("[tlhe importance of the increased
amounts of IGF-1 in milk from rbST-treated cows is uncertain .... Whether
the small additional amount of IGF-1 from rbST-treated cows has a significant
local effect on the esophagus, stomach, or intestine is unknown."); Alex Boston,
More Research Needed Into BST, MONTREAL GAzErrsE, June 3, 1995, at B3 (indicating that "[flurther studies will be required to determine whether the ingestion of higher-than-normal concentrations of (IGF from cows) is safe for
children, adolescents and adults") (quoting the AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
COUNCIL ON SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS

(1991)).

227. See Beiswenger, supra note 4, at 689-93. See also Hearings before the
House Agric. Subcomm. on Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry, 104th Cong. (1995),
available in 1995 WL 10384795 [hereinafter Hearings on Milk Price Supports]
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oversupply of milk and milk products in the United States.
Each year, farmers produce three percent more than the public can use, 228 while breeding animals that produce up to two
percent more than the year before. 229 Overproduction has
traditionally been discouraged by the federal government
which, for instance, spent $158 million in 1994 buying sur230
plus dairy products in order to stabilize prices.
Large farms or those increasing herd size are better prepared to institute the strict "factory" farming practices, and
absorb the much higher costs for labor, feed, 23 1 waste han(prepared statement of Keith Collins, Acting Chief Economist, U.S.D.A.) (indicating that in 1993 approximately thirty percent of the nation's dairy farmer
lost money).
The regional shifting currently taking place and the effects of this shifting
upon the dairy industry in various states have been well documented. See, e.g.,
Meanwhile, In Maryland,YORK DAILY REC., Oct. 23, 1996 (one out of five dairy
farms in Maryland have disappeared since 1992); Hiss, supra note 13, at *1
(Vermont has 80% less farms than it had forty years ago); Jerry Jackson, Despite Demand, DairiesDwindling,ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 6, 1996, at H1 (Florida lost ten percent of its farms in 1995, and has lost fifty percent since 1960);
Nita McCann, Milk Prices Rising But Not Soon Enough For Farmers, Miss.
Bus. J., Jul. 22, 1996, at 1 (Mississippi has lost about twenty percent of its dairy
farms in the last two years).
228. Compare Hiss, supra note 13, at 2, and Hearings on Milk Price Supports, supra note 227 (from 1985 through 1995 milk production increased an
average of 1.5% annually while commercial consumption increased 1.8% per
year) with Wendy Lin, Makeover for Milk: Decline in Consumption Leads to Major Shakeup, PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 26, 1997, at 1E (milk consumption was up
0.8% in 1996, capping a thirty year decline).
229. See Hiss, supra note 13, at 6.
230. See Steve Prestegard, Industry Report: Ag and Food Processing, MARKETPLACE MAGAZINE, Apr. 25, 1995. The federal government subsidizes the
dairy industry in two principal ways; through "marketing orders" which set
milk prices by region throughout the nation, see U.S. Congress Conferees Set to
Finalize FarmBill Thursday, CAPITAL MARKETS REP., Mar. 21, 1996, and "price
supports" whereby the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) purchases surplus
dairy products in order to stabilize prices. See Jennifer A. Galloway, Milk Price
Supports to Increase as Supply, Demand Near Balance, Wis. ST. J., November
21, 1995, at 8B. CCC dairy program expenditures averaged $350 million annually between 1991-1995. See Hearings on Milk Price Supports, supra note 227,
at *8.
231. It has been argued that the use of rbST would increase the nutritional
efficiency of cows, inferring that animals would require less feed. This, in fact,
may not be the case. Compare Jim Chen, The American Ideology, 48 VAND. L.
REV. 809, 869 (May 1995) (citing NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, METABOLIC
MODIFIERS: EFFECTS ON THE NUTRIENT REQUIREMENTS OF FOOD-PRODUCING ANI-
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dling and specialized equipment which successful use of rbST
demands. 2 32 If milk production increases, 23 3 the disparity between supply and demand may increase. 2 34 If the prices milk
producers receive for their products then drop, as many as
thirty percent of American dairy farmers may be forced out of
business, 2 35 with others forced to adopt rbST and its accom26 (National Academy Press 1994)), with Miller, supra note 92, at 508
(cows treated with rbST have "increased feed requirements") (citing Roy C.
Barnes & Peter J. Nowak, Bovine Somatatropin's Scale Neutrality and Constraintsto Adoption, AGRIC. BIOETHICS 143, 147 (Steven M. Gendel, et. al. eds.,
1990)).
Note also that the marked increase in the cost of dairy products, which
American consumers experienced in the Fall of 1996, was caused in part by bad
weather which affected the quality, price and availability of feed. See Shaun
Schafer, Dairy Demand/Pricesfor Dairy Products at Record Levels: Little Relief
Seen, TULSA WORLD, Oct. 13, 1996. Lower-quality feed causes cows to produce
less milk, a result which may be magnified in cows treated with rbST. See id.
232. See Beiswenger, supra note 4, at 689. But see Jennifer A. Galloway,
Monsanto Losing Money With rBGH, Company Blames Production;Experts Say
Farmers Have Been Slow To Accept Drug, Wis. ST. J., Apr. 14, 1996, at 1E,
available in 1996 WL 9913823 (farmers with smaller herds are able to monitor
their animals more closely, therefore allowing them to be more successful rBGH
users).
233. Compare A STUDY CONDUCTED BY THE EXECUTIvE BRANCH OF THE FEDMALS

ERAL GOVERNMENT, USE OF BoVINE SOMATOTROPIN (BST) IN THE UNITED STATES:
ITS POTENTIAL EFFECTS (photo. reprint 1995) Jan. 1994, at iii (a 1% annual in-

crease in milk production is anticipated from the introduction of rbST) and
Kuchler, supra note 65, at *4 (earlier studies had predicted increases of from
8% to 25%), with FY 98 Agric. Appropriations: Hearings before the Senate
Comm. on Appropriations,Subcomm. on Agric., Rural Dev., and Related Agencies, 105th Cong. (1997) , available in 1997 WL 8220631 [hereinafter Hearings
on FY 98 Agriculture Appropriations](statement of Dan Glickman, Secretary of
Agriculture) (indicating that milk production was expected to increase less than
1% in 1997).
234. See Lin, supra note 228, at 1E (indicating that milk consumption increased 0.8% in 1996, capping a thirty year decline); Trade With European
Union: HearingsBefore the House Comm. on Agric., Subcommittee on Livestock,
Dairy and Poultry, 105th Cong. (1997) available in 1997 WL 10571041 (prepared statement of Paul Drazek, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Trade)
(indicating that "U.S. dairy product exports declined about 7% in 1996... ").
235. See THE HUMANE FARMING ASSOCIATION, BOVINE GROWTH HORMONE,
supra note 166 (citing studies by the Office of Technology Assessment and Cornell University). Another view of this situation is that with less dairy farmers
we may have fewer cows, with this eventuality translating into less pollution
and a cleaner environment. See Jim Chen, Get Green or Get Out: Decoupling
EnvironmentalFrom Economic Objectives in AgriculturalRegulation, 48 OKLA.
L. REV. 333, 348 (1995) (describing dairy cows as "cud-chewing emitters of
manure, urine and methane"). See also Hearings on FY 98 Agriculture Appro-
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2 36
panying technology in order to increase output and income.
An economic burden would fall disproportionally on small
and mid-sized farmers.237
Some studies have concluded that after experiencing an
initial benefit, those who adopt rbST might eventually find
themselves in the same financial position they were in before
they started to use the drug. 238 In the absence of federal
price supports, which are planned to be phased out by the
year 2000, farmers might find that their financial position
has worsened. 2 39 Much of what may occur to the industry is
priations,supra note 233 ("cow numbers will continue their long term decline"
in 1997).
236. See Beiswenger, supra note 4, at 690.
237. Id. Accord Adler, supra note 16, at *17. See also Mike Ivey, BGH Sales
Up, But U.N. Retains Ban, CAP. TIMES, July 31, 1997, at 1B (explaining that
rbST "is more scale biased than anyone had thought") (quoting Brad Barham,
assistant professor of agriculture at the University of Wisconsin at Madison).
238. See Beiswenger, supra note 4, at 691 (citing Steven H. Lee, Controversy
in Bovine Hormone's Future, CHIC. TRIB., May 21, 1990, at 6).
239. See U.S. Congress Conferees Set to Finalize Farm Bill Thursday, CAP.
MARKETS REP., Mar. 21, 1996. Price supports will be incrementally decreased
from 1996 through 1999. See 7 U.S.C. § 7251(b) (1996). Note that when milk
prices are higher than the support price the latter have little net effect or purpose. See John Tucker, DairiesLove New Farm Bill, IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar. 30,
1996. However, when market prices fall below the support price, the supports
may provide a critical safety net particularly beneficial to small producers. Cf.
Hearings on Milk Price Supports, supra note 227, at *8.
In 1997, milk prices fell to a low of $10.70 per hundred pounds of milk, the
lowest in six years. See Dairy Farmers Up Pressure For Higher Minimum Milk
Price, Dow JoNEs NEWS SERV. Sept. 9, 1997. In response, 150 farmers rallied
outside the Capital with petitions signed by 9,000 milk producers asking the
government to set a temporary minimum price support level of $14.50. See id.
Dan Glickman, Secretary of Agriculture, citing 7 U.S.C. § 7251(b), stated that
he was prevented from complying with the petitions by the mandates of the
statute which set the minimum support level at $10.20 per hundredweight for
1997. See Mark Glover, Pressure'son for Milk Prices, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept.
15, 1997, at B3.
Furthermore, critics have charged that the antiquated milk marketing order system, see supra,note 230, artificially raises the prices paid to some producers while artifically lowering prices for others. See Judge Delays Order
Striking Down Rules on Pricing of Milk, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 1997, at B10. To
further complicate the issue and compound the problem of volatile milk prices,
a Federal District Court Judge recently enjoined the Secretary of Agriculture
from enforcing milk marketing orders in 28 regions throughout the country,
finding that the orders were unlawful under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act, 7 U.S.C. § 608(c)(18). See Minnesota Milk Producers v. Glickman,
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still speculative, depending upon many factors including the
demand for milk and the number of farms actually adopting
0

rbST. 24
VI.
A.

Analysis

The Limitations of Risk Assessment Methodology

The "risk-based approach" to regulatory oversight, as applied to biotechnology, is limited in its ability to adequately
regulate rbST. This is because of the assumptions from
which it operates, created by the regulatory scheme.
First, the assessment of a product does not focus on the
process of biotechnology, but on the products produced by biotechnology. 2 4 1 Biotechnology, as a means by which to physiologically alter organisms to produce certain desired traits or
characteristics, is not viewed as being inherently different
No. CIV. 4-90-31, 1997 WL 684863, at *5 (D. Minn. Nov. 3, 1997). Faced with
the prospect of pandemonium in the nation's milk markets, and the reality that
farmers in some regions might stand to lose as much as ten to fifteen percent of
their income, see Charles H. Taylor, Taylor Taking Lead On Dairy Issue, Gov'T
PRESS RELEASES, Nov. 17, 1997, available in 1997 WL 12104910 (press release
from the office of U.S. Rep. Charles H. Taylor, on file with the Federal Document Clearing House), U.S. District Judge David S. Doty delayed his order until February 15, 1998. See Judge Delays Order Striking Down Rules on Pricing
of Milk, supra note 239, at B10.
240. The actual number of farms currently using rbST and the number of
animals affected appears disputed, or is at least subject to rapid change. Monsanto had stated that fifteen percent of dairy farms and cows had used rbST
between 1994 and 1996. See Robert Steyer, Backers and Critics Both Wrong on
BST, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, Aug. 11, 1996, at O1E. According to a USDA
report, in 1995, "9.4% of farmers used BST on 10.1%" of the nation's cows. Id.
See also Int'l Dairy FoodsAss'n 1, 898 F. Supp. at 253 (stating that '[dlepending
on which statistics one accepts, nationwide ... about one-third of lactating cows
presently are being treated with rbST"); Ivey, supra note 237, at 1B (Monsanto
has recently estimated that twenty-five percent of dairy farmers have tried
rbST, while a University of Wisconsin survey of approximately 1,200 producers
showed adoption rates of 50% for large farms and 4% for small farms).
It is important to note that these statistics do not represent the percentage
of milk products which may be "affected" by rbST. Industry practice is to "pool"
milk provided by farmers. See Letter from Lisa Ward, Consumer Response Representative, The Dannon Co., Inc. to the author, August 7, 1995. Therefore,
without special precautions being taken, milk from farms using rbST will be
routinely combined with milk from farms not using the drug. See id.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
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from the selective breeding methods through which mankind
24 2
has traditionally modified animals or plants.
Second, oversight will probably not be exerted where
there is no "known" risk associated with the product at
hand. 2 43 Risks to human or animal health which are merely
possible, or those which may be unknown at present, are not
considered because they are speculative or remote. Because
cost is an issue, 244 and because regulation implies cost, there
is no room in the regulatory equation to account for such
risks.245
Third, risk assessment does not seek to analyze the possible social, economic or political effects which might follow
the introduction of a particular bio-tech product, 24 6 such as
rbST's potential to affect the dairy industry. These factors
are merely collateral to the risk analysis. In essence, risk assessment cannot always evaluate whether it is generally de24 7
sirable to have a certain product introduced.
Finally, regulation is generally viewed as an interference
248
or a barrier to development of the biotechnology industry.
The biotechnology industry is to be supported and encouraged, 24 9 and the increased use of dairy products is be promoted. 2 50 Regulation may be used as necessary to defend the
242. See supra text accompanying note 40.
243. See Exercise of Federal Oversight, 57 Fed. Reg. at 6762 (quoting PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, FACT SHEET ON CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES

(April 1991), stating that "[riegulations ... should address risks that are real
and significant rather than hypothetical or remote").
244. The "risk-based approach" to regulatory oversight endorsed by and described in the Scope document is viewed as critical if the "heavy costs" associated with regulation are to be avoided. See Exercise of Federal Oversight, 57
Fed. Reg. at 6760.
245. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
246. See Beiswenger, supra note 4, at 669-70. But cf. Jim Chen, Get Green or
Get Out: Decoupling Environmental From Economic Objectives in Agricultural
Regulation, 48 OKLA.L. REV. 333, 348 (1995). The author argues that by ignoring the socioeconomic impact of rbST the FDA merely continued an established
policy, fulfilled its obligations under the National Environmental Policy Act and
acted in a way that was environmentally sound.
247. See Beiswenger, supra note 4, at 670.
248. See supra text accompanying note 52.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 47 and 55.
250. See supra note 137.
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industry's image and protect its development. 25 1 Industry is
to be generally trusted with the responsibility for developing
safe biotechnological products, 2 52 the reporting of adverse reactions 2 5 3 and, in certain instances, for voluntarily determin254
ing whether drug residues may be consumed by humans.
These assumptions work together collectively, and can be
likened to a person who is crossing a street. The pedestrian
assumes there are no inherent risks to crossing. He assumes
there are no cars in the area, therefore no unexpected or
otherwise unknown dangers. He observes the immediate
area and finds no cars, and therefore no apparent dangers.
He concludes that there is no danger and that it is safe to
cross. He balances probabilities and assumes it will continue
to be safe from the time he starts to cross until he reaches the
other side.
The regulatory decision maker also acts upon certain assumptions. Unlike the pedestrian, however, he is aware that
there may be unknown risks in crossing this particular
street. He also knows there are remote chances of serious injury, and that a great number of individuals will cross. Yet,
he makes an economic decision not to construct a stop light,
rationalizing that he has no evidence that the risk of being
hit by a car justifies such an expense.
Furthermore, he has two conflicting mandates. The ability of people to cross must not be interfered with. Yet, he
must keep pedestrians reasonably safe, at least to the point
where safety becomes an interference. If he turns out to be
wrong, and people are injured at this particular corner, remedial action will be taken, which will prevent further injury.
B.

Known Risk and the Inherent Difference of
Biotechnology

The obvious problem with this risk assessment reasoning, in short, lies in the nature of the assumptions which form
251.
252.
253.
254.

See
See
See
See

supra text accompanying note 55.
supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
supra note 171.
supra text accompanying note 188.
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its foundation. Biotechnology, with a power to broadly affect
the way we live, or even how long we live, 25 5 is a technology
fundamentally different in scope than any other. In the case
of rbST, it is different because of the nature, scope and magnitude of the potential impact of the unknown and otherwise
remote risks which accompany its use.
The introduction of genetically modified organisms generally carries with it unknown risks, 25 6 the consequences of
which may not be evident until several generations have
passed, or until a unique environmental agent is
presented. 2 57 Although rbST has been thoroughly tested for
risks, 2 58 these very same tests have identified the potential
for unknown or remote hazards 25 9 which may not make
themselves fully known until after several generations of
Americans have used the product.
For instance, there remain questions of fact as to the
amount of IGF-1 which may be found in milk from treated
255. See Maher, supra, note 33, at 178-79.
256. See supra note 226. Generally speaking, there are many examples of
the potential unknown dangers of releasing certain organisms into the environment without understanding or appreciating the possible long term implications and consequences of such releases. For instance, by cross-pollinating
certain strains of corn, agriculturalists created a hybrid seed that produced a
greater yield, but that was less resistent to a certain type of fungus which wiped
out 15% of the American corn crop in 1970, causing an estimated $1 billion in
losses. Cf. Auchincloss, supra note 84, at 42-43. There is dire speculation as to
the potential of genetically modified organisms to produce harm after introduction. See also Maher, supra note 33, at 152-53 (potential to disrupt the food
chain); see id. at 142 (potential to alter the balances among species) (citing BuREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES BIOTECHNOLOGY: A LEGISLATIVE
AND REGULATORY RoADMAP, BNA SPECIAL REPORT ON BIOTECHNOLOGY #27, at 5
(Aug. 1989)). Cf Gil Lamont, Banking on Animal Organs, MAINSTREAM, Sum-

mer, 1995, at 11 (the European house sparrow, South American nutria, starling
and zebra mussel are examples of non-native species introduced into America
which had damaging effects on the environment or native animal populations).
257. See Maher, supra note 33, at 186. Cf. Auchincloss, supra note 84, at 42
citing BARRY COMMONER, MAKING PEACE WITH THE PLANET 1, 14 (1990) ( ex-

plaining that "[e]very action having an impact on an ecosystem has consequences which are inevitable and governed by the laws of nature .... To the
extent that the laws of nature are not known, the-consequences of an intrusion
will come as a surprise").
258. See supra note 207.
259. See supra note 226.
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cows, its composition, and its potential effect. 260 The FDA relied in part on the opinion of the NIH, which approved rbST
while unsure as to whether IGF-1 could affect the human digestive system. 26 1 The AMA similarly approves of the use of
rbST, yet does not know whether "higher than normal" ingestion of IGF-1 is safe. 26 2 The effect rbST has on other hor26 3
mones in our bodies is unknown.
Also unknown is the extent to which use of rbST increases mastisis in cows 26 4 and the possible ramifications this
may have upon human health. First, sophisticated husbandry techniques must accompany rbST use in order to limit
its detrimental effects. 2 65 Yet, while rbST must be prescribed
by a veterinarian, 26 6 ultimately, farmers may use the drug in
any manner they wish, or under any conditions as they may
exist on their farms. Given the expense rbST use inevitably
entails, and the sophistication proper use requires, the "conditions of use" are not necessarily "reasonably certain to be
followed in practice" as required by the FDCA.267
Second, the methods by which adverse animal reactions
are reported and gauged are inadequate. A system of voluntary reporting to scattered sources, including the manufacturer, cannot reasonably be expected to provide adequate
information regarding the seriousness or true rates of mastisis in treated herds.2 68 Even this reporting may not provide
the FDA with accurate information, as the FDA appears to
have trouble identifying when mastisis occurs as a result of
rbST use. 26 9 Furthermore, it is unknown for sure how many
farmers have even used the drug, or how many of the nation's
cows have been treated.2 7 0 Additionally, the percentage of
260. See supra notes 198 through 226 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 226.

262. See id.
263.
264.
265.
266.

See
See
See
See

supra text accompanying
supra text accompanying
supra notes 231, 232 and
supra text accompanying

note 225.
notes 154 through 159.
accompanying text.
note 160.

267. FDCA, 21 U.S.C. at § 360b (d)(2)(D).
268. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.

269. See supra note 170.
270. See supra note 240.
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the Nation's consumers who 1have ingested products from
27
treated animals is unknown.
If mastisis increases, so may use of the antibiotics used
to treat the infection. This will compound the disturbing and
dangerous prevalence of antibiotic administration to farm animals in the United States today. 2 72 Treated cows developing
a resistance to these antibiotics due to excessive exposure
may pass this resistance on to humans who consume their
milk. 273 The FDA has acknowledged the seriousness of
human overexposure to antibiotics,2 7 4 but is satisfied that antibiotic residues which may appear in milk can be adequately
monitored. 275 Yet, the current mechanisms gauging the antibiotics in our food supply are inadequate. This is true not
only because they have to some extent been proven so, 2 76 but
simply because more types of antibiotics are used than are
tested for. 2 77 In short, the probability that rbST use may
cause indirect injury to humans may be remote. Dangers
may be supposed, or presently incapable of measurement or
analysis. However, the nature of the injury, if it occurs, has
the potential to be widespread and extremely serious.
The premise of the Coordinated Framework and the
Scope document, that biotechnology is like any other technology, is inaccurate. The one-dimensional focus on known risk
is short-sighted. Appropriate risk assessment methodology
should recognize the uniqueness of biotechnology. When the
introduction of a genetically modified organism or product
carries with it an unknown risk with a potential to have a
substantial impact upon human health, a balancing test
should be engaged in to weigh the value of and need for the
product against the magnitude, not the probability, of the potential risk.
271. Id.
272. See supra notes 175 through 185 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 178 through 180 and accompanying text.
274. See supra note 181.
275. See supra text accompanying note 186.
276. See supra text accompanying note 194.
277. See supra text accompanying notes187-189 and 193; see also supra note
190 and accompanying text.
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In this way, products vital to human health or well-being
will survive the analysis, while products less vital may not.
Put simply, the passion and force we employ when we propel
our bodies across the avenue, and the care and precaution we
take when we do, should be relative to the need we have to
cross. When there is no urgent need, greater care should be
taken because of the deadly consequences, however remote, of
not doing so.
The exercise of a higher standard of care to guard
against remote and harmful events is not a surrender to
paranoia or irrational fear. It is merely a conservative undertaking which an agency, charged with the protection of
human health, should routinely engage in.
C.

Socioeconomic Effects

The risk assessment methodology applicable to rbST, because of its inherent limitations and emphasis on cost and
quantifiable and "unreasonable" risk,2 78 is insufficient to adequately measure a biotechnological product's total impact
upon society. The FDA was not required, nor perhaps is even
permitted, to consider the potential impact of rbST upon the
dairy industry. 27 9 This is so, in part, because biotechnological products are to be regulated like any other product, 28 0 and
socioeconomic factors are not requisite to the analysis. Yet,
rbST use may accelerate regional shifts in dairy production,
and perhaps engender the virtual disappearance of the family
farm. 28 1 This may not only quicken the further depression of
rural economies, 28 2 but herald a new age in animal drug use
83
and factory dairy farming techniques. 2
278. See supra notes 45 and 49 and accompanying text.
279. See supra note 246 and accompanying text. Cf Nitrofurans, 56 Fed.
Reg. at 41,903 quoting 44 Fed. Reg. 54,883 (stating that "[tihe law is clear that
FDA may not consider socioeconomic benefits in the determination of the safety
to human beings of a new animal drug. . . ") (emphasis added).
280. See supra text accompanying notes 37, 40 and 46.
281. See supra notes 227 through 240 and accompanying text.
282. The applicable statute states that it is Congressional policy to "stabilize
the economy of dairy farmers." See Agricultural Act, 7 U.S.C. at § 1446b (1997).
283. See supra text accompanying notes 231 and 232.
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Furthermore, the cumulative cost of the drug to the economy may very well outweigh any of its potential benefits.
Small farmers may be forced to adopt the drug in order to
compete with larger concerns. 28 4 If they do, they must also
adopt the expensive methods, equipment and increased feed
requirements that successful rbST use demands. 28 5 While
this may provide some with short term economic benefits, the
long term benefits, because of the many factors which affect
dairy prices, such as government intervention, the lack of
it,286

or increases in feed prices, 287 are less certain to follow.

Furthermore, if oversupply due to increased production results, or if demand decreases, prices will fall. In the absence
of federal price supports, the smaller farmers may find themselves with increased costs and falling prices. 2 8 Farmers
may inevitably experience what those who abuse addictive
drugs experience: a viscous cycle of dependency that leaves
one with an expensive habit and an unfulfilled need.
Therefore, it is imperative, for the foregoing reasons,
that the review of biotechnological products include non-scientific, social and economic factors. An appropriate balancing
test, as discussed, which weighs the value of and need for the
product against the magnitude of the potential risk presented
by the product, will afford regulatory agencies the ability to
determine whether a biotechnological product is truly desireable or beneficial.
D.

The Promotion of Biotechnology

The biotechnological regulatory scheme appears to be
designed in such a way that safety measures will not be permitted to interfere with the developing technology. Monsanto's influence on the drug's approval process has been
questionable, as has the FDA's seeming acquiecence to this
influence. 28 9 The company is accused of engaging in certain
284. See supra text accompanying note 236.
285. See supra notes 231-32 and accompanying text.

286. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
287. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 238-239 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 138-149, 151 and 153 and accompanying text.
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activities, in Canada, which, had they occurred in America,
would have been sufficient grounds to deny approval of the
drug. 290 The FDA's decision to permit three of its employees,
with close ties to the company, to participate in the drug's
approval and review process was either an act of blatent bias,
or one of utter foolishness because of the likelihood that
charges of bias would result. 2 9 1 It does not take a GAO investigation for even an uniformed layperson to reach one of these
two, rather obvious conclusions, either one of which also provided the Secretary of the USDHHS with the necessary
grounds to deny approval of rbST. 2 9 2 The company's seeming
influence on the political process 29 3 and on public health organizations and individuals 2 94 upon which the public relies
for objective information and analysis is unsettling.
The impression is one of undue industry influence and
agency bias 2 95 operating under color of law, where the primary objective is to sell a technology, and get people to cross
the biotechnological street. Indeed, risk assessment methodology may, by its very nature, be particularly vulnerable to
bias. Critics have asserted it is often employed "to defend a
decision which has already been made." 2 96 The reaction of
the American and world communities to rbST approval 2 97 is
stark evidence of the public's perception of the approval process and its result.
It is vital to the credibility and effectiveness of regulatory
agencies, such as the FDA, that they maintain a neutral, nonpartisan posture. The laws governing biotechnology which
290. See supra note 133, 150 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes140-146 and accompanying text.
292. See supra note 133.
293. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 151 through 153 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 133 through137 and accompanying text.
296. See Commoner, supra note 205, at 365-66. The author explains that
"the new technology is chosen in advance of the risk assessment... [which] is
not used to decide which technology to use, but rather how to best defend the
choice already made." Id. Cf. E. Donald Elliott, The Futureof Toxic Torts, 25
Hous. L. R. 781, 795 (1988) (stating that "[a]dministrators reach their decisions
on political grounds, then instruct their lawyers to write opinions rationalizing
them in terms of the relevant scientific and technical facts").
297. See supra notes123-132 and accompanying text.
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mandate that the industry be supported, shielded or encouraged, 2 98 are incompatible with those seeking to protect
the public. It is inappropriate for a regulatory agency to operate under a mandate which demands that the agency performs a protective function for the industry it is charged with
regulating. While regulatory agencies can never be immune
from political pressure, they must be free from overtly prejudicial mandates, which define the scope of their authority in
favor of certain industries and at the potential expense of
animal and human health and well-being.
It may be a legitimate function of government to offer incentives to the private sector to invest in emerging technologies, or to generally support their efforts to do so, if
government views the new technology as potentially beneficial to the country as a whole. It is somewhat of a different
matter for government to essentially guard and promote,
through its offices and by its finances, an unnecessary, perhaps detrimental product, simply because that product happens to be produced through a potentially beneficial
technology. The private sector is often best left to its own devices and resources to produce and promote products which
should ultimately be allowed to face the free market system
without the assistance of government. 2 99 Here, it may be
fairly judged as either beneficial or not beneficial, worthwhile
or not worthwhile.
When a government agency with regulatory responsibility is mandated to perform a cheerleading function of any
kind for the very industry it is supposed to regulate, an obvious conflict of interest is created. This speeds the deterioration of the public's faith in the regulatory system as a whole.
The success of biotechnology as an industry depends in part
on a positive public perception. This presupposes the public's
faith in the willingness and ability of the government to properly regulate the technology, thereby protecting the public
against any potential dangers. It may actually be antithetical to the objectives of government to jeopardize that faith by
298. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.

299. See generally Anonymous FDA Whistleblowers, supra note 131.
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requiring regulatory agencies to act as public relations officers for the very same industries over which they are required to perform watchdog functions.
If one believes, however, that a function of government
should be to actively promote an industry, then perhaps this
function is better performed by an independent office with
this as its sole function. In this way, the American people
may at least receive what they are ultimately asked to pay
for: publicity from press agents, and regulatory protection
from regulators.
E.

The Failings of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act

The approval of rbST illustrates that the FDCA as currently written may be inadequate to properly regulate biotechnological products. For instance, the Act required that
rbST be assessed for its "cumulative effects." 300 However,
short term animal studies 30 1 and the available scientific information 30 2 may have been inadequate to determine such effects. Where the cumulative effects of an animal drug upon
man or the animal cannot be adequately determined, caution
requires that the potential value of the drug be weighed
against the magnitude of the potential detriments of its cumulative effects prior to its approval. The FDCA should be
amended to reflect this sober view of regulatory scope.
The Act appears to require that the manufacturer describe methods for detecting drug residues in animal endproducts. 30 3 However, under the FDCA, it appears the FDA
was permitted to rely on "adequate information" as a substitute for an assay test.30 4 The FDA did not require Monsanto
to develop such a test, despite the feasibility of doing so, 3° 5
and in stark contrast to actions previously taken by the
agency when faced with similar scenarios. 30 6 Despite concern
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

FDCA, 21 U.S.C. at § 360b (d)(2)(B).
supra note 205.
supra note 226 and accompanying text.
supra notes 66, 67 and accompanying text.
supra note 68 and accompanying text.
supra note 69 and accompanying text.
supra note 66.
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over the potential effects upon human health from consuming
products from animals treated with rbST,3 0 7 American consumers drank milk from treated cattle for over two years
before the GAO stepped in to advise the FDA to address the
3 08
problem of drug residues.
The FDCA should be amended to ensure that new animal
drug applicants develop a test for residues of the new drug in
the animal-end product used for human consumption if no
such testing methodology exists. The FDA should have absolutely no discretion to accept other information as a substitute for this requirement.
Additionally, the Act requires that the animal drug be
safe for the animal. 30 9 Despite the serious potential side-effects of the drug, 3 10 the FDA determined that the risks to animals were "manageable." 3 1 1 This could only be because the
agency felt that the side-effects could be avoided through
proper use, or because the ailments resulting from rbST use
could be controlled or cured through the use of drugs or other
management techniques. Yet, the conditions under which
the drug will be used are not totally controlled by the agency.
Furthermore, the fact that side effects resulting from rbST
use may be treated by still other drugs, does not necessarily
mean that the product is safe for the animal it is used upon.
The approval of an animal drug with serious side effects and
with no potential to benefit the animal is contrary to the statutory policy encouraging the raising of cattle free from
3 12
disease.
Thus, if a goal of the FDCA is to protect animals from
drugs with serious deliterious effects, the Act must be
amended to specify that such a drug cannot be used unless its
potential benefit to the animal outweighs the risks of its use.
Furthermore, in light of the unknown risks inherent in the
use of rbST and because the drug may in fact represent an
307. See supra Part IV(A).
308.
309.
310.
311.

See
See
See
See

supra note 69.
supra note 58.
supra text accompanying notes 160 through167.
supra note 169 and accompanying text.

312. See Agricultural Act, 7 U.S.C. at § 1446b.
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"imminent hazard" 3 13 to the health of man and animals,
there would be little lost and possibly much gained by placing
a moratorium on rbST use until some of these questions surrounding the drug have definitive answers.
F.

Labeling

Should existing regulations prove inadequate to protect
human health, labeling regulations which mandate that consumers be informed when dairy products are produced from
rbST treated animals, would at least provide consumers with
a choice whether or not to be exposed to such products in the
first place. Appropriate labeling regulations will ensure that
consumers are provided with the choice whether to trust the
conclusions of a profit-motivated industry, and a government
with a mandate to support the industry, that there is no danger in crossing the biotechnological street. The alternative is
to simply rely on government to construct a regulatory stop
light designed to prevent future injury once some harm has
already occurred. This assumes, of course, that any prospective injury could even be traced to rbST use. In this event,
and in the absence of labeling giving the public a choice,
harm may occur not to a lone individual making a voluntary
decision to cross a byway, but to a population that has been
compelled to trust the conclusions of government and industry that rbST is safe.
The FDA is somewhat handcuffed by the language of the
Scope and Framework documents which does not recognize
biotechnological products as "different" from others. 3 14 Because mandatory labeling would denote just such a difference, it would therefore be misleading and a violation of the
FDCA require same. 3 1 5 However, the Scope document also
affords agencies the authority to label biotechnological products 31 6 and the FDA has traditionally been afforded broad
discretion in labeling decisions. 31 7 Furthermore, it is the
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
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FDCA, 21 U.S.C. at § 360b (e)(1).
supra text accompanying notes 86 and 87.
supra note 93 and accompanying text.
supra note 50 and accompanying text.
supra note 92.
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agency's own interpretation of the law which binds it, and
which has led it to create a policy which interferes with the
consumer's statutory right to know by discouraging truthful
labeling. 3 18 Specific labeling guidelines which mandate that
products from rbST treated animals be labeled as such would
provide consumers this right. They would also eliminate the
3 19
varying state interpretations of the "Interim" guidelines.
Some of these guidelines have prevented manufacturers
which insist on rbST-free labeling from freely availing themselves of the benefits of interstate commerce. 3 20 Some may,
32 1
in fact, be unconstitutional.
VII.

Conclusion

Biotechnology holds tremendous potential benefits for
mankind, and more potential to drastically alter the way we
live than any other previous technology. It is an emerging
science well worth encouraging. However, current regulatory
methodology is inadequate in that it fails to take into account
the social and economic factors which may be directly affected
by biotechnology. As well, existing regulation does not seek
to analyze the balance between the overall potential benefit
versus the overall potential detriment of introducing a biotechnological product.
Furthermore, the industry is regulated by laws which, on
the one hand, are overly concerned with the development and
protection of industry, and on the other hand exclude from
analysis or consideration the unknown, yet wholly probable
consequences, most notably the human safety and health consequences, of introducing certain biotechnological products
into the mainstream. For instance, while the evidence indicates that rbST is safe, considerable questions remain about
318. See supra note 93. Furthermore, the guidelines have contributed to results which are anomalous, at best. For instance, in Illinois, Ben and Jerry's
was prohibited from advertising their products as BGH-free, see supra note 105,
while in New York, The Dannon Company, which uses milk from rbST treated
cattle, is permitted to label its products as containing no artificial anything.
See supra note 240.
319. See supra note 102 and accompanying.
320. See supra notes 102, 104 and 105 and accompanying text.
321. See supra Part II(D)(2)(a).
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the long term impact it may have on human health. For this
reason alone, rbST use should be immediately suspended until all questions regarding its possible long term impact on
human health have been answered.
It would be wholly unwise to turn a blind eye to factors
which, although not readily quantifiable, may be quite real.
Because of what is at stake, our fervor to develop the biotechnological arena must yield to a cautious and more sober
analysis of the possible ramifications of our actions. It may
be of no small importance to our children and grandchildren
that we repeatedly ask ourselves the question: If we're wrong,
what will the consequences be?
Given the state of the dairy industry, rbST was a poor
product to choose as the first agricultural biotechnological
product, primarily because it is an unnecessary, and perhaps
even counterproductive product. Here, the singular pursuit
of profit by a company which sensed an economic windfall,
combined with a blind urgency on the part of government to
encourage a new technology, has produced an apparent willingness on the parts of both to engage in questionable, improper or simply overtly partisan activities on behalf of the
new technology. This has not only tainted the drug's review
process, but has jeopardized the very goals both government
and industry were attempting to achieve. Viewed from one
extreme, it would not be totally speculative nor would it be
unwarranted to conclude that industry and government have
employed a regulatory, economic and political system that
forces the American public to accept a product which it currently does not need, which it may never truly benefit from
and which it may, in fact, be harmed by.
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